Declaring War or Sentencing Criminals? Assessing Short-Term and Long-Term Counterterrorism Success by Galston, Arielle Lehner
W&M ScholarWorks 
Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
4-2016 
Declaring War or Sentencing Criminals? Assessing Short-Term 
and Long-Term Counterterrorism Success 
Arielle Lehner Galston 
College of William and Mary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Galston, Arielle Lehner, "Declaring War or Sentencing Criminals? Assessing Short-Term and Long-Term 
Counterterrorism Success" (2016). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 943. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/943 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at 
W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 

	   2	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………2 
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER……………………………………………………………3 
THEORY CHAPTER……………………………………………………………………..8 
 LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………8 
 PARADIGMS AND SUCCESS…………………………………………………16 
 RESEARCH DESIGN…………………………………………………………...23 
THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY……………………………………………………29 
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW……………………………………………………29 
 CRIME OR WAR……………………………………………………………….32 
 EXPECTATIONS………………………………………………………………38 
 OUTCOMES……………………………………………………………………40 
THE EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA………………………...…………..……………44 
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW……………………………………………………44 
 CRIME OR WAR……………………………………………………………….46 
 EXPECTATIONS………………………………………………………………54 
 OUTCOMES……………………………………………………………………56 
THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM……………………………………60 
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW……………………………………………………60 
 CRIME OR WAR……………………………………………………………….63 
 EXPECTATIONS………………………………………………………………68 
 OUTCOMES……………………………………………………………………71 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA………………………75 
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW……………………………………………………75 






	   3	  
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 On the evening of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed the 
American people and the world from the Oval Office. In his brief remarks, he portrayed 
the United States as a nation under attack and a military prepared to respond. He called 
on other nations to join the United States and “stand together to win the war against 
terrorism.”1 Using such rhetoric, President Bush labeled the 9-11 attacks an act of war. 
Declaring war on terror is not new in the post 9-11 world, becoming an increasingly 
popular response for leaders in the aftermath of large-scale events. Is a war approach to 
countering terrorism the best and will it be successful in the long-term? 
 Historically, countries have implemented various counterterrorism policies. Some 
of these policies have treated terrorists as criminals, using the existing legal system. 
Other policies have considered terrorist attacks as acts of war and implemented practices 
associated with combatants. Counterterrorism literature discusses these different 
perspectives, classifying the former as the Criminal Justice Paradigm (CJP) and the latter 
as the War Paradigm (WP). Existing literature briefly considers the benefits and 
disadvantages of policies implemented under each paradigm. However, it mainly focuses 
on the implementation of specific polices and how those have or have not been effective.  
 Scholars have debated the paradigms and specific polices, but there has been little 
work on examining the empirical record. In this thesis, I seek to adjudicate that debate by 
taking a step back from solely examining the individual policies and instead classifying 
the counterterrorism approaches as either CJP or WP. In doing so, I aim to fill the gap in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks," (speech, The Oval Office, DC, 
September 11, 2001). 
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the existing literature and determine which counterterrorism paradigm approach leads to 
success in the short-term and long-term.  
 The creation of the 24/7 media and increased globalization has resulted in greater 
attention worldwide to terror attacks and government responses. States’ perceptions of 
terrorism as a criminal act versus an act of war influences policy choices. Depending on 
the counterterrorism practices employed, terrorists can garner support and legitimacy for 
their cause or be delegitimized as criminals. Understanding the long-term implications of 
policies and not just focusing on the immediate successes are critical in an age where 
instant rewards are expected. My research is therefore relevant to policymakers as states 
respond to terror attacks. A mourning public demands immediate assurance, but the 
policies that may provide short-term successes may only perpetuate the conflict.  
 This thesis is split into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two 
discusses the rationale for my theory. The chapter is divided into three main sections. In 
the first, I present the existing literature on the two paradigms and definitions of 
counterterrorism success. I conclude the section by addressing what is missing in the 
literature. In the second section, I develop my theory on the CJP and the WP. From my 
theory, I present two hypotheses, one for each paradigm. In the final section, I provide 
my research design. In this section, I first introduce my four case studies followed by a 
review of the existing literature on measuring counterterrorism success. I then define how 
I measure success to be a decrease of violent attacks perpetrated by the terrorist 
organization. Finally, I discuss how I use articles and journals to qualitatively assess a 
state’s counterterrorism policies, determining each to be CJP or WP. I use the University 
	   5	  
of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to compare levels of violence with the 
implementation of CJP or WP policies.2  
 In Chapters Three through Six, I present my four cases studies. Each chapter is 
divided into four sections. First, I review the history of the country and the emergence of 
the terrorist organization. Second, I analyze the state’s counterterrorism policies and 
practices. I explain how each is either CJP or WP. Third, I provide my expectations on 
how the state’s counterterrorism policies affected the terrorist organization’s level of 
violence. Finally, I interpret the data from the GTD, explaining how the state’s policies 
influenced the levels of violence.  
 Chapter Three examines my first CJP case study, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA). Since Irish Independence in 1922, Catholics in Northern Ireland sought to unite 
with their southern sovereign neighbor. The IRA emerged as the dominant terrorist 
organization fighting for the Catholic cause. The British government deployed troops to 
Northern Ireland in 1969 to resolve rising conflict between the ruling Protestant majority 
and Catholic minority.3 I selected the case of the IRA as the British government 
implemented a wide range of CJP policies in the 35 years of this study. The case 
highlights the implications on terrorist violence when CJP policies dominate. 
 In Chapter Four, I analyze my second CJP case, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA). During the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, Basque nationals experienced 
extreme repression as the government banned their language and cultural symbols. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database (for mapping terror groups; accessed April 9, 2016), 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. All future references to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism 
Database refer to this reference.  
3 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, 
ed. Robert J. Art et al (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).    
 
	   6	  
ETA emerged in the 1950s in response to the harsh legislation. After Franco’s death in 
1975 and Spain’s subsequent transition to democracy, the group continued to execute 
terrorist attacks.4 I selected to study the ETA for two main reasons. First, the Spanish 
government sought to avoid militarizing its response to the ETA. Second, while the 
Spanish government democratized and implemented CJP policies, the police force 
continued executing WP practices. Trained under Franco’s repressive authoritarian 
dictatorship, the police force had to be retrained in new practices. The case highlights the 
issue of overlapping CJP policies with WP practices.  
 In Chapter Five, I present my first WP case, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). The British colonizers favored the minority Tamils, providing them with better 
education and employment opportunities. Animosity towards the Tamils grew amongst 
the majority Sinhalese population. After Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, the Sinhalese 
dominated the government, implementing anti-Tamil legislation. Responding to 
suppression, numerous violent and peaceful Tamil groups emerged to demonstrate 
against the government. Established in 1976, the LTTE became the most powerful Tamil 
organization. Growing tensions between LTTE members and the Sri Lankan security 
forces ignited a civil war.5 The government employed largely WP policies, using its 
military to launch operations against the LTTE and inviting its members to the 
negotiating table. I selected to study the LTTE because the case demonstrates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Fernando Reinares and Rogelio Alonso, “Confronting, Ethnonatioanlist Terrorism in Spain: Political and 
Coercive Measures Against ETA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert 
J. Art et al (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).   
5 Thomas A. Marks, “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” in Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art et al  (Washington D.C: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2007).    
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implications of treating a terrorist organization as an insurgency and relying on the 
military to forcefully eliminate the group.   
 In Chapter Six, I examine my final WP case, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC). Since gaining independence from Spain in 1819, Colombia has 
experienced almost constant cycles of violence. Initially a peasant defense organization, 
FARC has since dropped most of its Marxist ideology. The Colombian government has 
instituted a wide range of WP policies in its attempts to eliminate the terrorist 
organization. These policies have included military operations, negotiations, and targeted 
assassinations.6 I selected FARC as my final case study for two reasons. First, the case 
highlights the long-term affects of using WP policies, even with the introduction of 
improved American counterterrorism resources and intelligence. Second, FARC remains 
an active organization, controlling territory within Colombia. 
 I conclude with Chapter Seven, where I discuss my findings from the four case 
studies. I explain how CJP and WP policies impact levels of terrorist-sponsored violence. 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Peter Waldmann, “Colombia and the FARC: Failed Attempts to Stop Violence and Terrorism in a Weak 
State,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art et al (Washington 
D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2007). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORY  
“The United States deliberately uses the word ‘war’ to describe our relentless campaign 
against al-Qa’ida. However, this Administration has made it clear that we are not at war 
with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific 
organization—al Qa’ida.” –2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism7 
 
 In this chapter, I will first review the existing literature on the two paradigms, 
criminal justice (CJP) and war (WP), as well as the literature on defining 
counterterrorism success.  I argue that while there has been previous research on 
counterterrorism policy success, there is a gap in analyzing a country’s policies 
collectively under the two paradigms. Following this review of the literature, I will 
present my theory along with the two hypotheses generated from the logic. I theorize that 
policies under the CJP find short-term success elusive, but maintain long-term success. 
Conversely, policies under the WP achieve short-term success, but fail to succeed in the 
long-term. I define success as the decrease of violence by the terrorist organization. In the 
final section of the chapter I will outline my research design. The following chapters 
consist of four cases studies, which I will use to analyze the policies employed and 
successes attained.  
 
Literature Review 
 Previous studies have largely focused on specific counterterrorism policies. Little 
research has been conducted on the paradigms under which these policies fall. In this 
section I first provide definitions of the two paradigms. Second, I outline the existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, (2011): 2, accessed February 20, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.   
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literature on the CJP and the WP before discussing how others have defined success. 
With this section I aim to provide context for the following theoretical discussion on 
counterterrorism policies’ short-term and long-term successes.  
 
Counterterrorism Paradigms 
  In the CJP, terrorists are defined as individuals committing crimes. Esun Kurtulus 
argues that these individuals are killers, bombers, and hostage takers. They should be 
“charged, tried, and convicted” as any other criminal.8 In using the judicial system to try 
those perpetrating illegal acts, a government can “avoid claims that they were arresting 
terrorists for their ideas.”9 As the acts are criminalized, the cause is delegitimized.10  
 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the transition away from CJP 
polices that had begun in the 1990s.11 CJP policies focus on both the practices used to 
apprehend terrorists and the treatment of detainees. Audrey Cronin emphasizes that the 
treatment following imprisonment is just as important as how terrorists are taken into 
custody.12 The practices used in the CJP align with the policies utilized by law 
enforcement in the arresting and treatment of criminals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Esun N. Kurtulus, “The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the United 
States and Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35 (2012): 39, accessed September 23, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/1057610X.2012.631456. 
9 William Josiger, “Getting it Right: Understanding Effective Counterterrorism Strategies,” in Coping with 
Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, Counterstrategies and Responses, ed. William R. Thompson et al (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2010), 241.    
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 17. 
11 Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models,” Stanford Law Review 60 (2008): 1049-1096, accessed September 30, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040408; Laurie R. Blank, “The Consequence of a ‘War’ Paradigm for 
Counterterrorism: What Impact on Basic Rights and Values?” Georgia Law Review 46 (2011): 734, 
accessed September 12, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918116. For discussion 
on Israel’s different paradigm choices, see Ersun Kurtulus, “New Counterterrorism.” 
12 How Terrorism Ends, 16-32. 
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 The policies implemented treat terrorists as criminals who have perpetrated illegal 
acts.13 To arrest, put on trial, and convict a terrorist can be a lengthy process requiring 
many resources. Evidence must be found and compiled, often requiring cross border 
cooperation, something that is not always possible or easily facilitated.14 Cronin warns of 
the danger posed by the releasing of terrorists from prison should they return to the 
terrorist organization.15 Punishing terrorists with CJP policies does not guarantee their 
removal from the organization as is true in a WP policy.     
 CJP policies implement practices that maintain the protection of civil liberties. 
Actions violating a person’s rights give credence to the terrorists’ cause and tarnish the 
government’s image.16 A government’s destruction of civil liberties elevates terrorists as 
just fighters against an immoral state adversary. Paul Wilkinson cautions for the necessity 
of a balance between protecting civil liberties and the maintaining of order.17 Often the 
difficulty arises of finding such a balance of protecting rights and maintaining national 
security.18  
 Following deadly attacks, calls for retribution and security can push a government 
to seek WP policies. Needing to respond to a terrified and enraged public, state leaders 
have often come to automatically declare war on the perpetrators and terrorism, 
employing war rhetoric. A declaration of war casts the terrorists as enemy combatants to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Chesney and Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence,” 1081; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 17; 
Kurtulus, “New Counterterrorism,” 39. 
14 Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2005), 9. 
15 How Terrorism Ends, 17. 
16 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 135; Eric van 
Um and Daniela Pisoiu, “Dealing with Uncertainty: the Illusion of Knowledge in the Study of 
Counterterrorism Effectiveness,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 8 (2015): 234, accessed September 26, 
2015, doi: 10.1080/17539153.2014.981400; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal 
State Response (New York: Routledge, 2011), 75-77.  
17 Terrorism versus Democracy, 75. 
18  For more about the combination of various aspects of differing paradigms, see Chesney and Goldsmith, 
“Terrorism and the Convergence.”   
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be defeated by the state’s military.19 As terrorist acts are committed worldwide, a global 
battlefield has been established.20 In a conventional war, an enemy soldier is guilty for 
being a member of the military. Similarly, in the WP, guilt is established through 
association with an organization and not necessarily involvement with a specific attack.21 
Basic rights of the criminal justice system are denied just as they are denied to enemy 
combatants and prisoners of war during a conventional conflict.22  
 The WP assumes that terrorism is a form of warfare.23 Policies are not concerned 
with finding individuals guilty as long as there is reasonable suspicion of association with 
a terrorist organization.24 Additionally, there is greater acceptance of measures by the 
public for otherwise unlawful actions.25 Through the use of discourse, what used to be 
unthinkable has become acceptable. Jackson analyzes the discourse post 9-11 that labels 
terrorists as the barbarous, uncivilized other creating a normalization of extra-judicial 
measures.26   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kurtulus, “New Counterterrorism,” 39-40. 
20 Blank, “Consequence of a ‘War’ Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” 727.  
21 Ganor, Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 9. 
22 Blank, “Consequence of a ‘War’ Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” 734.  
23 For further discussion on the “War on Terror,” see Daniel Byman, “A Corrective That Goes Too Far?” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005): 511-516, accessed November 17, 2014, doi: 
10.1080/095465591009403; Yee-Kuang Heng, “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk-Management 
Exercise in War Clothing?” Security Dialogue 33 (2002): 227-242, accessed February 15, 2015, doi: 
10.1177/0967010602033002009; Paul Rogers, “Lost Cause: Consequences and Implications of the War on 
Terror,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 6 (2013): 13-28, accessed March 23, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/17539153.2013.765698; Gilles Andréani, “The ‘War on Terror’: Good Cause, Wrong Concept,” 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 46 (2004): 31-50, accessed March 25, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/00396330412331342446; Keith Spence, “World Risk Society and War Against Terror,” Political 
Studies 53 (2005): 284-302, accessed March 26, 2015, doi: 10.1111/J.1467-9248.2005.00529.x. 
24 Ganor, Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 9. 
25 Kurtulus, “New Counterterrorism,” 37-49. 
26 Writing the War on Terrorism: Language Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005). For more on the post 9-11 discourse and its creation, see Richard Jackson, 
“Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism,” Democracy and Security 1 (2006): 147-
171, accessed February 9, 2015, doi: 10.1080/17419160500322517; Richard Jackson, “Language, Policy 
and the Construction of a Torture Culture in the War on Terrorism,” Review of International Studies 33 
(2007): 353-371, accessed September 12, 2015, doi: 10.1017/S0260210507007553; Amy Gershkoff and 
Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s 
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 The War on Terror, a creation of the WP, has established a global battlefield 
without boundaries.27 In a conventional war, detained enemy soldier are held without trial 
until released at end of the conflict. However, as Wilkinson details there is a problematic 
conundrum for those detained in the War on Terror. As terrorism as a tactic will never be 
defeated, detainees face indefinite imprisonment with few avenues for proving 
innocence.28 
 Both the CJP and the WP have advantages and disadvantages to their use. A 
measure may be successful in the short-term, but detrimental to the long-term objective. 
A strong offense may warn against attacks, but it can also provoke others to join if the 
actions are perceived to be immoral or unjustifiable.29 As the literature details, there is a 
balance that needs to be found.30  
  
Definitions of Success  
 Little research has been conducted on whether counterterrorism policies 
succeed.31 Scholars who do examine these polices struggle to settle on a definition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rhetoric,” Perspective on Politics 3 (2005): 525-537, accessed March 5, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689022. 
27 Blank, “Consequence of a ‘War’ Paradigm for Counterterrorism,” 728-728.  
28 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 77. 
29 Ibid., 102-103. 
30 For further discussion of both CJP and WP Counterterrorism policies, see Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald 
R. Krebs, “Talking about Terror: Counterterrorist Campaigns and the Logic of Representation,” European 
Journal of International Relations 16 (2010): 125-134, accessed September 19, 2015, doi: 
10.1177/1354066109352917; Gregory D. Miller, “Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and 
Successful State Policies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 331-342, accessed September 5, 
2015, doi: 10.1080/09546550701424059; Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership 
Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36 (2012): 9-46, accessed September 
10, 2015, doi: 10.1162; and Avi Kober, “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada: The Quest for 
Effectiveness,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 27 (2007): 76-93, accessed September 26, 2015, 
https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/8292/9353.  
31 T.W. van Dongen, “Break it Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in 
Counterterrorism,” Journal of Applied Security Research 6 (2011): 357, accessed September 13, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/19361610.2011.580264. 
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success.32 While many conclude that there is no policy that brings lasting success, they 
nevertheless leave open the question of its definition.33  
 Louise Richardson states that if success is defined as defeating terrorism, then it 
will never be accomplished. A definition must differentiate between the tactic, terrorism, 
and the groups who employ the tool.34 In combating specific organizations, Cynthia Lum 
et al. further caution that actions taken for short-term aims may undermine the ability to 
achieve the long-term objectives.35 Thus, not only does a definition need to differentiate 
between the tactic employed and organizations targeted, but it must also distinguish 
between short-term and long-term outcomes. 
 Several authors put forward possible definitions of policy success. One is simply 
achieving the aims the policy sets out.  Upon achieving these aims, there must be support 
with very little critique from the public for the means employed.36 Simply stating success 
as achieving the aims set out is subjective to interpretation. As policies change so do their 
aims, meaning an ever-evolving definition of success.  
 Another proposed definition of success is the decreasing of radicalization.  In 
analyzing Islamic terrorism and radicalization, Bryan Groves posits that “stemming the 
allure of the jihadist narrative” is a victory.37 However, this conception of success is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Van Um and Pisoiu, “Dealing with Uncertainty,” 230; Bryan Groves, “America’s Trajectory in the Long 
War: Redirecting Our Efforts Toward Strategic Effects versus Simply Tactical Gains,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 36 (2013): 30, accessed September 18, 2015, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.739078. 
33 Daniel Byman, “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” The National Interest (2003): 84, accessed October 1, 
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897485; Allan McConnell, “Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey 
Areas In-Between,” Journal of Public Policy 30 (2010): 346, accessed October 1, 2015, doi: 
10.1017/S0143814X10000152.  
34 What Terrorists Want: Containing the Threat (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006), 203-
204; English, Terrorism: How to Respond, 122. 
35 “Are Counter-Terrorism Strategies Effective? The Results of the Campbell Systematic Review on 
Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Research,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 2 (2006): 491, accessed 
October 2, 2015, doi: 10.1007/s11292-006-9020. 
36 McConnell, “Policy Success,” 350-351. 
37 “America’s Trajectory in the Long War,” 31-39. 
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limited as it allows for an assumption that radicalization is a precursor for joining a 
terrorist organization. Not all who are radicalized commit terrorist acts and not all 
terrorists are radicalized prior to joining organizations.38 While terrorism and 
radicalization are linked, they are not synonymous and therefore the definition of success 
for counterterrorism cannot be determined by radicalization.  
 Willem de Lint and Wondwossen Kassa argue for defining success as the 
prosecution of terrorists, as it can lead to a decrease in attacks.39 The assumption that the 
two are inherently connected should be considered. Prosecuting terrorists could decrease 
attacks as members are removed and others become fearful of acting. However, there 
could also be a reverse effect of increased attacks as terrorist organizations attempt to 
intimidate or appear strong despite losing members.   
 In Avi Kober’s analysis of Israeli action in the Second Intifada, he concludes that 
the targeted killing of political and spiritual leaders was a means for influencing Hamas 
to terminate the use of violence. The targeting of military leaders was ineffective as these 
deaths created martyrs for the cause and failed to disrupt operations or cause tensions 
within the organization.40 Groves argues that targeted killings are only a tactical success 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Radicalization is not always a precursor for joining a terrorist organization. A person can be radicalized 
and never commit a terrorist act while conversely, a terrorist may only become radicalized after joining a 
terrorist organization. For a further discussion on the radicalization process and its connection to terrorism 
see Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 7-36, accessed February 21, 2015, 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/2 and Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism 
II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 37-
62, accessed February 21, 2015, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/3. 
39 “Evaluating U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: Failure, Fraud, or Fruitful Spectacle?” Critical Criminology 
23 (2015): 354, accessed September 29, 2015, doi: 10.1007/s10612-014-9264-1. 
40 “Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada,” 77-83.  
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that may even undermine the long-term objectives. Instead, the lack of spectacular 
attacks executed against the United States is a strategic success.41 
 Daniel Byman concurs with Groves in proposing that success be defined as the 
elimination of intrastate violence. In his analysis of Al Qaeda, Byman concludes that the 
terrorist organization’s transition to targets abroad is a success.42 This definition is 
problematic for several reasons. First, if a group continues to commit violence, it remains 
active, possibly gaining support, and spreading its message. The move to violence abroad 
could be a temporary transition until the group is capable of attacking more secure 
domestic targets. Further, targets abroad can still be valuable assets, creating harm 
militarily, economically, or to one’s allies. 
 I define success as the decrease of violence by the terrorist organization. A 
temporary decrease in violence followed by a resurgence of attacks is a short-term 
success. Continued reductions in violence are a long-term success. I emphasize that the 
decrease of violence and not the termination of a group is a success. The evolution of a 
group to a non-violent form is a means for freedom of peaceful expression.  
 
What Is Missing 
 Existing research has largely focused on individual counterterrorism policies. 
Defining and assessing success of individual policies is difficult as these policies are not 
isolated. As T.W. van Dongen concludes, it is difficult to judge where the successes and 
failures lie with regards to each specific measure.43 I argue that to better judge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “America’s Trajectory in the Long War.” 
42 “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 81. 
43 “Break it Down,” 364. 
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counterterrorism success, there needs to be a greater focus on the two paradigmatic 
approaches rather than individual policies.  
 A government’s perception of terrorism, as a criminal act or an act of war, 
influences the policies selected. Examining specific policies allows for conclusions on 
case specific counterterrorism campaigns, but fails to allow for broader conclusions. In 
using the paradigms, analysis can be expanded to suggest whether a criminal justice or 
war approach to counterterrorism will provide success. With this thesis, I aim to fill this 
gap in the research.  
  
Paradigms and Success 
 Do policies that treat terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants produce long-
term success? In this section I will discuss my theory of how a government’s perception 
of terrorism, as a crime or an act of war, produces policies that generate short-term or 
long-term success. I will then conclude with my two hypotheses generated from the 
proposed theory.  
 
Crime or War 
 I have highlighted the policy focus of existing counterterrorism research. In 
categorizing a government’s perception of terrorism, I am able to assess which approach, 
criminal or war, generate success in the short-term and long-term. Success is defined as 
the decrease of violent acts by the terrorist organization. The difference between a short-
term and a long-term success is that in the latter, the decrease to violence is lasting, while 
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in the former it is temporary. Individual policies are key to those successes and failures, 
but the paradigm is what remains consistent.   
 
Figure 1. Criminal Justice Paradigm 
 
 
 Counterterrorism policies that use the criminal justice system treat terrorists as 
perpetrators of crimes (see Figure 1). Terrorist acts are criminalized just as a kidnapping, 
murder, or extortion is treated. A state’s criminal justice system is used to detain, try, and 
punish criminals. Similarly, in this paradigm, terrorists are arrested, charged with a crime, 
police gather evidence, a trial is conducted, and if found guilty, the perpetrator is 
punished. Criminal justice procedures can be lengthy and expensive as it takes manpower 
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to proceed through the system, from first identifying an individual who needs to be 
apprehended until a punishment is delivered.  
 Identifying who is responsible for an attack in and of itself may be time 
consuming. If a group claims responsibility then the pool of suspects is narrowed, but 
knowing who is a member rather than a supporter or sympathizer may not be clear. Low-
level operatives may not always be the faces on the videos released to the public claiming 
responsibility. Obtaining information on the identities of low-level members requires 
dedicated work by officials to infiltrate an organization. Whether that be imbedding an 
agent, developing trusted informants, or technological monitoring, these practices must 
be conducted in accordance with the law. Further, in arresting a member of the 
organization, officials risk revealing their source of information. The costs and benefits of 
such a decision must be weighed.  
 During the time that it takes to use the criminal justice processes, the terrorist 
group maintains operations. Undeterred, the group is able to continue planning and 
executing attacks. As these incidents continue, the state’s government appears weak and 
incapable of protecting its citizens. A powerless government image empowers the 
terrorists and instills fear in the public. In executing attacks, terrorists seek not only the 
carnage of a single incident, but also the fear that is instilled in the wider population. As 
the government fails to prevent attacks, the terrorists succeed. In the short-term the use of 
CJP policies fail to prevent a group from continuing to execute violent acts.    
 Just as criminalizing terrorist acts have short-term implications, so too are there 
long-term ones. A criminal act is an illegal, illegitimate act. Treating terrorist attacks as 
criminal acts delegitimizes the perpetrators and the cause. As terrorists continue to 
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commit these illegal acts for a cause, the terrorists’ objective is undermined. Supporters 
and members, both current and potential new ones, may be deterred as the cause is 
weakened by its illegitimacy. Just as a state must justify actions to obtain public support, 
so too must a terrorist organization. When the actions are delegitimized by a criminal 
status, obtaining support becomes increasingly difficult over time.  
 The criminal justice system aims to guarantee citizens’ rights and liberties. Often 
human rights abuses emerge when actions are taken outside the criminal justice system, 
such as during times of war or a crisis. Using a state’s laws to prevent terrorism builds 
protections against potential human rights abuses. Respecting the rights of individuals, 
even those who are accused of perpetrating horrendous acts, gives a state’s government a 
reputation of being just and acting with morals. Maintaining such a position elevates a 
government’s character in comparison to the terrorists. As the government seeks to 
eliminate the terrorist organization, other international actors are increasingly likely to 
express support and volunteer resources if the government is perceived to be the moral 
victim against an unjustified aggressor. More human, financial, and technical resources 
allocated to the counterterrorism policies, increases the possibility that members of the 
terrorist group will be located, deterring potential recruits and supporters.  
 Following the lengthy criminal justice process, those found guilty may be 
imprisoned. I theorize that imprisoning low-level terrorists does not disturb the group’s 
operations if there are plenty of recruits ready to take their places. However, the 
imprisoning of a leader or other top skilled member, such as the bomb maker or 
technology expert, does increase the probability that the government will eliminate the 
terrorist organization. First, the arrest of a skilled member is detrimental to the 
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organization as there may not be others readily available with such talents. Second, the 
arrest of the leader may prove to be even more detrimental to the organization. The 
removal of the leader may produce a succession crisis as various members vie to become 
the head of the organization. Further, some members may oppose the emergence of a new 
leader, as the previous remains alive. Allegiance to the individual leader poses a potential 
internal crisis for the group. Similar to the arrest of these influential members, the use of 
the death penalty produces instability within the organization as a skill or leadership 
vacuum emerges.  
 As the use of the criminal justice system delegitimizes the terrorists, protects 
against human rights abuses, and arrests individuals, the group’s ability to continue 
operations is hampered. Fewer recruits, decreased support, and internal turmoil weaken 
the terrorists’ propensity to plan and execute attacks. Internal conflict disrupts operations 
as individuals compete. Decreased membership, or the fracturing of the group into small 
sub-organizations, results in fewer individuals prepared to execute an attack. Members 
may decide to leave the organization as the risk of being arrested outweighs the benefits 
of fighting for the cause, furthering operational disruptions. In the long-term, the 
organization weakens and violence decreases, a success for the government. Such logic 
leads to my first hypothesis: 
 H1: Governments who adopt the Criminal Justice Paradigm will experience  
         increased terrorist violence in the short-term, but decreased levels in the  
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Figure 2. War Paradigm
 
 A declaration of war on terrorism or the deployment of troops indicates a 
government’s decision to implement WP policies (see Figure 2). Similar to CJP policies, 
individual terrorists may be arrested. Where the two diverge is how those suspected 
terrorists are treated following detainment. In the WP, imprisoned individuals are treated 
as enemy combatants. Given the status of “prisoner of war” (POW), they remain in 
detention until there is a ceasefire or an exchange between the warring parties.  
 If the captured terrorist is a low-level member of the organization then he or she 
becomes a martyr for the cause. However, if the terrorist is a leader or a skilled member 
the indefinite imprisonment may produce a succession crisis for the former and a void in 
capabilities for the latter. Similarly, the targeted assassination of a top-level terrorist may 
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produce a gap in knowledge or leadership disrupting the organization’s ability to plan and 
execute operations.  
 In the short-term, the arrest or elimination of terrorists disrupts operations. 
However, the treatment of detainees, the POW status, and the use of targeted 
assassinations negatively impact the government’s long-term objectives in two ways.  
First, potential supporters sympathize with the victims of government counter terror 
operations. Second, war terminology and acts indicate the state is at war, which is 
traditionally conducted between legitimate actors. The declaration of war and POW status 
justify the terrorists and their cause. Terrorists achieve the self-desired image of warriors 
fighting for justice, generating prestige for themselves, their cause and acts.  
 Deployment of troops and the use of war rhetoric increase the propensity for 
human rights abuses. Enemies in war are often seen as evil and barbarous others. As the 
government generates a war environment, terrorists become depicted as the other. Often, 
war warrants the use of otherwise unjustifiable practices. Immoral and illegal practices 
tarnish the government’s image domestically and internationally. As the state is viewed 
to be using inexcusable acts, the terrorists gain support and the cause is reinforced. 
Recruitment of new members and resources enables the terrorist organization to continue 
perpetrating violent acts in the long-term. Through WP policies, as the government 
attempts to eliminate terrorists, the state perpetuates the group’s existence.  
 Ceasefires, negotiations, and peace talks are tools governments employ to find a 
peaceful solution to continued violence. The practice of talking and negotiating with 
terrorists is a WP policy. Ceding territory, political participation, or resources to a 
terrorist organization rewards violent action and legitimizes the group. Criminals do not 
	   23	  
negotiate with the government to cease committing crimes in exchange for a reward. The 
practice of talking to terrorists provides an incentive for continued violence as a means to 
achieve a desired goal. Such logic leads to my second hypothesis:   
 H2:  Governments who adopt the War Paradigm                       
  will experience decreased terrorist violence in short-term, but fail to      
             achieve long-term success.  
 
 
 If my hypotheses are true, I should find that in the cases where CJP policies 
dominate the government fails in the short-term to reduce violence, but achieves long-
term success. Conversely, a state employing a WP dominant counterterrorism approach 
achieves short-term success, but sees an increase in violence after the initial reduction.   
 Within this section, I proposed a theory that assumes a government’s perception 
of terrorism influences the type counterterrorism policy pursued. From this theory, I 
proposed two hypotheses, one for the CJP and a second for the WP. In the next section I 




 In this section, I outline my research design. First, I discuss my four case studies, 
including what I hold constant across the cases. Second, I briefly review the existing 
literature on measuring success before selecting my own measurement of success. 
Finally, I conclude with explaining how the counterterrorism policies are identified as 
CJP or WP. 
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Case Study Research Design  
 I have selected four case studies, two from each paradigm. In all four cases I am 
able to control for several variables by holding constant the aims of the group, territorial, 
the targets, largely domestic, and the form of state government, democracies.44 There are, 
however, some important differences among the terror organizations. To investigate 
whether these differences might account for the policy outcomes in these cases, I will use 
process tracing. That is, I will rule out alternate explanations for success by closely 
examining the precise sequence of events that contributed to the success (or failure) of 
the counterterrorism strategy adopted.  
 The cases vary in the regions selected to demonstrate that the effects of the 
selected counterterrorism paradigm, criminal or war, have similar effects across 
continents. I will present the cases in the following order: the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in the United Kingdom, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), in Spain, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For more information on democracies and counterterrorism, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Discourse 
and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 44 
(1998), accessed March 7, 2015, doi: 10.1111/1467-8497; Max Abrahms, “Why Democracies Make 
Superior Counterterrorists,” Security Studies 16 (2007), accessed November 14, 2014, doi: 
10.1080/096364107012399424; Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat 
Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 26 (2003), accessed October 11, 2014, doi: 
10.1162/106366003765609561. 
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Measuring Success  
 The literature varies on how best to measure counterterrorism success. Numerous 
authors provide explanations for why specific measures should be employed.45  However, 
the literature does not go into depth on how to differentiate between long-term and short-
term success. I will first discuss several possible measures prior to selecting one. 
 Van Dongen proposes two measures, first the number of attacks and second, the 
number of victims, for gauging counterterrorism success. He argues that at first glance, 
these would seem like useful indicators. However, he concludes that terrorist 
organizations can increase or decrease activity for many reasons independent of the 
government’s counterterrorism strategy. Additionally, terrorist groups may decide to 
increase attacks on more soft targets as others become increasingly difficult to strike.46 
Soft target attacks could be more frequent for numerous reasons—they are easier to 
execute and also have greater numbers of victims. 
 Byman similarly argues that attacks are necessary to demonstrate to the public 
that an organization is active and a threat. Therefore, it is in a terrorist organization’s 
interest to execute a sufficient number of attacks to maintain membership, a consistent 
flow of recruits, and awareness of presence for its target audience.47 A weak organization 
that is, for example, losing membership may increase attacks, and as a result, their 
number of victims. Thus, while the number of attacks and victims may sometimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Byman, “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 75. Van Dongen in “Break it Down” (357-371) discusses 
material damage, population support for the government, and the economy as measures of success. Byman 
in “Scoring the War on Terrorism”, examines the terror group’s leadership structure’s strength as a 
potential measurement. Mueller and Stewart consider a cost-benefit approach in “Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 7 (2011), accessed September 30, 
2015, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/43.  
46 Van Dongen, “Break it Down,” 358-360. 
47 “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 77. 
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indicate the efficacy of counterterrorism measures, there are other better measures of 
policy success.   
 Some scholars have suggested the number of arrests as an indicator of success. 
This measure differs from attack and victim counts, as arrest rates are the result of actions 
by the government, rather than strategic choices made by a terrorist organization. 
However, Van Dongen questions whether arrests accurately measure success—when 
arrests are made, others can be influenced to join an organization, replacing those lost, or 
even triggering a growth in membership.48 Byman adds that without knowing the actual 
size of membership, it is difficult to determine how much damage a specific number of 
arrests cause. There are benefits to arrests, such as for gathering information from 
detainees, but as a measure of success it is not sufficient.49 
 Terrorists need to be able to recruit new members to maintain their organizations. 
Recruitment is partially dependent on the ability of an organization to operate freely. 
Several authors thus suggest recruitment rates and freedom to operate as measures of the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism actions.50 However, as Byman concludes, the former is 
not easily calculated, as these are clandestine organizations.51 For the latter, Richardson 
states that terrorists “have simply adapted,” evolving to compensate for the challenges 
posed by the counterterrorism policies.52 Thus neither recruitment nor freedom to operate 
is solely a sufficient measure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “Break it Down,” 362-364. 
49 “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 76-78. 
50 Ibid., 76-77; Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 209-215; Van Um and Pisoiu, “Dealing with 
Uncertainty,” 237. 
51 “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 76. 
52 What Terrorists Want, 209. 
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 Other scholars propose the support of the population for a terrorist organization as 
a measure of success. Fighting for a community, gives terrorist groups justification for 
their actions.53 The support of the community is key to the survival of the terrorist group, 
as it provides a secure base for operating.54 Cronin further details the careful balancing 
act terrorist organizations must play when implementing attacks, as they can risk losing 
valuable support.55 Without a safe haven, the group loses ease of movement. Strife 
among members can emerge, sometimes leading to fracturing of the group.56 However, 
not all terrorist organizations fight for an earthly audience, nor do all necessitate the 
support of a population. While some groups do rely on a community, it is not true of all 
terrorist organizations, making it a useful measure for only specific cases.   
  
Dependent Variable-Counterterrorism Success  
 I will be using a similar measure to Van Dongen’s number of attacks for assessing 
counterterrorism success. While there are issues with this measurement, as previously 
discussed, I will not use it exclusively. Rather, I will combine this quantitative measure 
with the qualitative analysis of policies to provide context.  
 Success is defined as the decrease of violent acts perpetrated by the terrorist 
organization. The difference between short-term and long-term success is that in the 
former, the organization resumes or increases violent means to achieve its aims within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bart Schuurman, “Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western 
Democracies, 1963-1998,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36 (2013): 167-169, accessed September 22, 
2015, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.747072. 
54 Byman, “Scoring the War on Terrorism,” 76-78; Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, “Are Counter-Terrorism 
Strategies Effective?” 509; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends. 
55 How Terrorism Ends, 104. 
56 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 215-216. 
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five years. The latter is when a terrorist group continues to decreasingly use violence. I 
use the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to plot when 
violence increases, decreases, or remains constant over the course of time.  
 
Independent Variable- Criminal Or War Paradigm  
 Articles and journals are used to qualitatively analyze the counterterrorism 
policies associated with combating each terrorist organization. These policies are then 
identified as either CJP or WP. Comparing which policies are used when the violence 
fluctuates or remains constant in the GTD enables me to determine which paradigm 
produces successes and failures in the short and long-term. I use process tracing to create 
a causal story that allows for me to estimate whether the policies implemented are 
responsible for the variations in my dependent variable.  
  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that research on counterterrorism has focused mainly on 
specific policies. As there is hardly ever a single policy being implemented at one time, I 
suggest there needs to be greater research on the two paradigms under which these 
policies may fall. Following my review of the literature, I presented my theory on 
paradigm influence on counterterrorism success. Two hypotheses were generated from 
this logic. Using the GTD combined with the qualitative analysis of newspapers and 
articles, I test these hypotheses in four following case studies. In the subsequent four 
chapters I will present and evaluate the findings of the case studies followed by a final 
concluding chapter.  
	   29	  
CHAPTER THREE 
THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
 The first Criminal Justice Paradigm (CJP) case I study is the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom from 1970 through 2005. During the first 
five years of the study, the British government instituted a range of emergency 
legislation. In 1976, the government transitioned to normalizing the IRA, relying 
predominantly on the normal criminal system. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I provide a brief overview of the 
history of the Northern Ireland conflict and the rise of the IRA. Second, I examine several 
counterterrorism policies, identifying each as CJP or War Paradigm (WP). Third, I 
conjecture how the policies implemented impact the levels of IRA violence. Finally, I 
provide an analysis of the data in the context of the policies.  
 
Historical Overview 
 The Irish conflict originates from the creation of the United Kingdom in the 1800 
Acts of Union. During the First World War, Irish protests to the Union peaked. In 
response to the demands, the British government passed the 1922 Government of Ireland 
Act, creating two separate Irish states. In the north, the six Protestant-majority counties 
formed as one and the 26 Catholic-majority southern counties created the second. In 
1947, the southern state became independent as the Republic of Ireland (see Appendix 
A). The Constitution of the new Republic claimed sovereignty over not only the southern 
state, but also the six northern counties.  However, to the dismay of the Catholic minority 
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in Northern Ireland, the northern state remained in the United Kingdom. For the better 
part of two decades, the Catholics sought to reunite with their southern neighbors.57  
 In the late 1960s, Northern Irish Catholics accepted the Union and the local 
Stormont government, but demanded equality with the Protestant majority. A peaceful 
civil rights movement turned violent as the Protestant government forces responded 
harshly to Catholic demonstrators. In 1969, British military units deployed to Northern 
Ireland to restore order.58 Intended to be a short deployment, Operation Banner turned 
into a decades long mission, ending in 2007.59 Not only were the troops unable to quickly 
restore order, the British government in 1972 determined Stormont unfit to govern. The 
British Parliament dissolved Stormont, directly ruling Northern Ireland until the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement.60   
 
IRA Emergence 
 In 1917, the IRA emerged from the integration of two predecessor groups, the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Irish Volunteers, founded in 1859 and 1913 
respectively.61 After the establishment of the Irish Republic, the IRA evolved to embrace 
a Marxist ideology, focusing on class rather than religious differences. As a result of the 
shift in ideology, the IRA largely ceased to exist militarily. During the Northern Ireland 
civil rights protests of 1968 and 1969, the IRA was unwilling to respond to calls for 	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58 Ibid., 66. 
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doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.802609. 
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mobilization in defense of the Catholics.62  In 1970 in response to the growing conflict in 
the north, the IRA split into the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA.63 The 
former largely remained in the evolved form of a Marxist non-militant organization while 
the latter resembled the IRA prior to Irish independence.64  
 
Aims and Tactics  
 The IRA used a three-pronged strategy to achieve its aim of a united Irish 
Republic. First, the IRA sought to raise British costs for continued occupation of 
Northern Ireland. The aim was to weaken the British government’s resolve for 
maintaining control and governance. Second, the IRA designed to terrorize the Protestant 
community to weaken its support for the Unionist militias, quasi-governmental 
organizations. Third, the IRA needed to establish itself as separate from the OIRA with 
its own base of support.65 Establishing itself as an army, the IRA planned to militarily 
achieve each of these three goals as a means to obtain the long-term objective of 
unification with the Irish Republic.  
 IRA tactics evolved throughout the Troubles with the improvement of bomb 
making technology and expertise.66  In the 1970s, the IRA targeted indiscriminately, 
planting devices in crowded city and economic centers. However, it became apparent to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 67-68; Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences 
for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 53. 
63 Ibid., 63. Louise Richardson explains in “Britain and the IRA” (68) that the emergence of the PIRA did 
not eliminate the OIRA. Rather, the latter remained active in small numbers and ultimately joined the 
political system.   
64 Freeman, Freedom or Security, 53. The acronym IRA refers to the Provisional IRA.  
65 Ibid., 54; Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 71. 
66 The conflict in Northern Ireland is often referred to as the Troubles.  
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the terrorists that they would garner greater support if they specifically targeted 
politicians and security forces.67  
 
Crime or War 
 During the nearly four decades of the Troubles, the British government instituted 
a range of counterterrorism policies. There is no clear distinction between the end of one 
practice and the beginning of another. However, in the mid-1970s, counterterrorism 
policy shifted from emergency measures to predominantly employing the normal 
criminal justice system.68  I will now briefly discuss five of the policies used during the 
Troubles, highlighting each measure’s establishment and practice.  
 
Operation Banner: British Military Deployment (1969-2007) 
 Growing civil rights’ violence necessitated British government action. In 1969, 
Operation Banner deployed troops to Northern Ireland to restore order.69 Initially 
welcomed by both Catholics and Protestants, the British troops contributed to the 
escalation of tensions. Despite efforts in the mid-1970s to turn over primary 
responsibility for security to local law enforcement, British troops continued to influence 
the environment. Two events highlight the continued impact of the British troops’ 
presence.  
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Provisional Irish Republican Army (169) and Michael Freeman Freedom or Security (56-57).  
69 Louise Richardson clarifies in “Britain and the IRA” (77) that Britain only deployed troops to Northern 
Ireland after the Irish Republic threatened to intervene and asked the United Nations for assistance.  
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 First, on July 31, 1972, Operation Motorman deployed British troops to remove 
no-go areas. Republicans, those who wanted an independent Ireland, had established 
neighborhoods dangerous to outsiders. In response, Loyalists, those wanting to remain in 
the Union, had created their own. These neighborhoods came to be known as no-go 
areas.70 To improve security, remove IRA safe havens, and enhance patrol capabilities, 
the government ordered troops to retake control of the neighborhoods. The military 
anticipated heavy civilian resistance and prepared for a lengthy fight.71 Second, in May 
1987, the British Special Air-Service (SAS) received intelligence of a planned IRA attack 
on a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) barracks. The SAS set up around the barracks, 
laying in wait for the IRA members. As the terrorists arrived, the SAS opened fire, killing 
eight. The incident highlighted many Catholics’ fears that the British employed a shoot-
to-kill policy.72  
 The presence of an occupying military generated a warlike atmosphere for both 
the troops and civilians. However that was not Operation Banner’s intent. British troops 
deployed to act as a police force, a CJP policy. Nonetheless, the military at times 
employed WP practices within the overarching CJP.  
 
Operation Demetrius: Internment Without Trial (1971-1975)  
 The passage of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act in 1922 first introduced 
internment without trial as emergency legislation. In 1939, the Act was made permanent, 
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establishing internment without trial decades before its use during the Troubles.73 On the 
evening of August 9-10, 1971, officials arrested 342 Republicans in Operation 
Demetrius. True of most internment sweeps, very few of those detained were IRA 
members.74 The policy aimed to detain potential terrorists to prevent attacks. 
Theoretically, officials could question suspects once in custody to determine who was an 
IRA member. Those deemed not to be would be released with the remaining given 
trials.75 During the four years of use, authorities arrested a disproportionate number of 
Catholics, 1,874 out of a total of 1,981 individuals. The practiced continued until the 
release of the final detainee on December 5, 1975.76 
 For nearly a whole year after Operation Demetrius, British officials conducted 
authorized torture on detainees. Government agents predominantly used five specific 
practices: placing a hood over a detainee’s head, forcing detainees to stand against a wall 
for an extended period of time, disrupting sleep patterns, limiting food and water, and 
continuous loud noise.77 Select detainees thought to hold key information about the IRA 
were subjected to the practices.78 Following reports of abuse, the British government 
commissioned the Parker Report in November 1971. Published in March 1972, the report 
declared the acts illegal.79  
 The period of internment without trial was a combination of the CJP and WP. A 
piece of British legislation since 1922, internment without trial was a CJP policy. Yet, the 
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74 Ibid., 53-54; Sanders, “Operation Motorman,” 470. 
75 Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army, 185. 
76 Ibid., 169. 
77 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 86. 
78 Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army, 178-179. 
79 United Kingdom, Committee of Privy Counsellors, Lord Parker Report, 1972. Timothy Shanahan in The 
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use of authorized torture provides for the presence of the WP for two reasons.  First, the 
intent of the policy was to use practices on the internment detainees not used on the 
general prison population. Second, the practices were later declared illegal. While the 
policy of detaining individuals was a CJP policy the treatment of specific individuals 
once in custody was a WP policy, highlighting the overlap of the paradigms.   
 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act: Diplock Courts (1973-2007) 
 In the town of Derry on January 30, 1972, protesters took to the street 
demonstrating against the internment policy. The British military response resulted in the 
death of 13 protestors and spectators.80 Known as Bloody Sunday, the events propelled 
the IRA to increase their efforts.81 In response, the British government commissioned the 
Diplock Report. The Report recommended first, the gradual phasing out of internment 
without trial and second, the establishment of Diplock Courts.  
 The 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act formally established the 
CJP Diplock Courts. A tribunal of judges replaced the jury to protect against 
intimidation. In addition to the new trial system, suspects could be held and interrogated 
without charges for three days with information gathered admissible in a trial.82 In 1974 
Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, which 
extended the 1973 Act’s jurisdiction to all of Great Britain and increased the three days 
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of detention to a week.83 The Acts of 1973 and 1974 marked the transition towards the 
use of Britain’s normal judicial system. 
 
Criminalization and Ulsterisation (1976-2005) 
 The CJP policies, Ulsterisation and Criminalization, both employed mechanisms 
of the normal criminal justice system, local law enforcement agents and prisoner statuses. 
Ulsterisation conceptualized the Northern Irish conflict as an internal security issue rather 
than an insurgency. Following the implementation of the policy, local officials, the RUC, 
became responsible for security as opposed to the military.84 Two main factors propelled 
the transition. First, the British Parliament sought to reduce the costs on the British 
military. Second, the government aimed to reduce the negative connotations that 
accompanied the use of troops. As demonstrated in the earlier years of the Troubles, the 
use of the military exacerbated the cycle of violence. In using local agents of the RUC, 
Parliament hoped to reduce the tensions driving the conflict.85 
 Simultaneously to Ulsterisation, Parliament enacted Criminalization. The British 
government in June 1972 had granted incarcerated paramilitary members the status of 
political prisoners. The status provided certain rights denied to regular criminals. 
Paramilitary prisoners could meet with each other, wear their own clothing instead of 
prison jumpsuits, and did not have to work. However, Criminalization terminated the 
special status in March 1976. Both current prisoners and those arrested after were treated 
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as ordinary criminals.86 IRA inmates responded with hunger, blanket, and dirty strikes 
into the 1980s.  
 
Supergrass Trials (1981-1983) 
 Reports of abuse emerged following the implementation of the extended detention 
of suspects provided for in the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act. The British government subsequently tightened controls and implemented 
Supergrass trials.87 Beginning in earnest in 1981, Supergrass trials granted detainees the 
opportunity to submit testimony against other IRA members for a reduced sentence.88 
The CJP policy of exchanging testimony for a lesser punishment predated the Troubles as 
a practice within the British judicial system. 
 
Negotiations (1986-2005) 
 Not officially recognized, it is believed that secret negotiations began in 1986 
between the British government and the IRA. Four years later in 1990, recognized talks 
commenced resulting in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.89  The signatories of the 1998 
Agreement agreed to, “renounce violence, establish a new Northern Ireland legislative 
body, increase cross-border ties, and free prisoners.”90 In accordance with the Agreement, 	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1987.  
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in October 2001, the IRA initiated its disarmament. Following British and Irish 
accusations of the IRA’s resumption of illegal activities, the group stalled disarmament in 
February 2005 for five months. A year later in July 2006, the British and Irish 
governments released a joint statement confirming that the IRA had finalized the 
decommissioning process.91  
 The British and Irish governments’ negotiations with the IRA indicate the 
emergence of a WP policy during the mid 1980s. My theory argues that talking with the 
IRA and negotiating demands for peace legitimized the IRA’s cause and its members. 
 
Expectations  
 In this section I discuss how I expect the British policies to have affected the 
levels of IRA-sponsored violence. The section is separated into three periods of analysis, 
War Atmosphere (1970 to 1976), Normalization (1976 to 1986), and Negotiating For 
Peace (1986 to 2005).  
 
War Atmosphere  (1970-1976) 
 Deployment of British troops, enactments of emergency legislation, and the use of 
torture highlight the overlapping of British CJP and WP counterterrorism policies in 
Northern Ireland. If my theory stands, the data should reflect an increase in IRA violence 
following the deployment of British troops as they were acting as a police force. As the 
troops remained in Northern Ireland, the level of IRA violence was dependent on the 
function the troops performed, policing or military. I expect violence to have continued 
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increasing even though my theory predicts a decrease as the presence of troops generated 
a war atmosphere.   
 The arresting of predominantly Catholics in internment raids and the use of 
torture on select detainees amplified the Catholic-Protestant divide.92 While my theory 
suggests the use of CJP policies should have reduced violence in the long-term, the 
context in which internment without trial was implemented negates these effects. Rather, 
the predominance of WP practices amplified the IRA’s cause, generating support, and 
enabling the propensity for increased violence in the long-term. I project there was an 
overall trend of an increasing number of attacks between 1970 and 1976.   
 
Normalization (1976-1986)  
 After six-years of predominantly emergency legislation and military policing, the 
British government altered its counterterrorism strategy. From 1976 till the end of the 
Troubles, the British government actively sought to normalize the IRA threat. 
Ulsterization and Criminalization highlight this transition in the mid 1970s.  
 Following the turn towards normalization, I expect to see an initial increase of 
violence in reaction to policy changes and years of WP practices. However, in the long-
term, I theorize that the violence decreased aided by the implementation of Supergrass 
trials in 1981. As the IRA was normalized and treated as criminals, the group lost 
legitimacy, resources, and support, hindering its potential to execute attacks. 
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Negotiating For Peace (1986-2005) 
  In 1986, the British government and the IRA commenced negotiations, a WP 
practice. I theorize that the introduction of peace talks produced an increase of violence 
as the IRA sought greater concessions from the government. With the signing of the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement and subsequent disarmament, it is rational to believe IRA-




 In this final section I discuss the data compiled in the University of Maryland’s 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on the number of IRA attacks committed during the 
years 1970 to 2005 (see Appendix B). First I discuss the three periods of time within the 
conflict I highlighted above followed by a conclusion.  
 
War Atmosphere  (1970-1976) 
 Following the fracturing of the IRA into the Provisionals and the Officials in 
1970, terrorist attacks increased sharply, peaking in late 1971. IRA violence decreased 
through early 1975, only beginning to increase again in 1976. The initial escalation 
succeeded by a contraction of IRA attacks appears to align with my projections.  
 The increase in violence can be attributed to several factors. First, an escalation of 
terror can be a resultant of the emergence of the Provisional IRA in 1970, which sought 
to establish itself independent of the Official IRA. Second, the military performed a 
policing function resembling a CJP policy, which according to my theory results in short-
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term increased violence. Third, internment raids failed to disrupt IRA activity, as the 
majority of the 1,981 people detained were not IRA members. The disproportionate 
targeting of Catholics in the raids produced ready volunteers to join the Republican 
cause.93 Fourth, the use of authorized torture within the internment camps fueled the 
support for the IRA already generated from the British military presence and internment 
raids.  
 The lack of my predicted decrease of violence can be attributed to the use of CJP 
policies and the failure of WP practices to disrupt the group’s operations. The described 
increase of violence was significant as the military provided legitimacy to the IRA’s 
cause through the deployment of troops to Northern Ireland, the targeting of Catholics in 
internment raids, and the employment of torture. A subsequent decrease in violence from 
1972 to 1975 can be attributed to the British troops’ ability to return stability to Northern 
Ireland in the short-term. However, the stability came at a cost of continued support for 
the IRA in the long-term as the escalation of violence in 1976 demonstrated.  
  
Normalization (1976-1986)  
 Normalizing IRA prisoners to the status of criminals and using the police force as 
the primary law enforcer coincided with an initial increase of IRA violence from 1976 to 
1979. According to my theory, the long-term affect of CJP policies is a decrease of 
violence as the terrorist group loses legitimacy, support, and operational capabilities. The 
decrease in violence from 1979 to 1986 supports my theory as violence continued to 
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decrease five years after the British government implemented the new CJP normalization 
policies. 
 A marked increase in violence from 1982 to 1983 contradicts my theory. The 
escalation can be attributed to the deaths of imprisoned IRA hunger strikers in 1981. A 
return to decreasing levels of IRA violence suggests that the temporary influx of attacks 
was an outlier to my theory.  
  
Negotiating For Peace (1986-2005) 
 After eight years of an overall trend of decreasing violence, IRA attacks 
intensified from 1986 to 1988. There are two plausible explanations for the increase in 
terror attacks. First, despite both IRA and British government denials, it is believed that 
secret negotiations began between the two in 1986. As my theory states, an increase in 
IRA activity can be attributed to the group’s efforts to compel the government to cede to 
greater demands. Second, the public increasingly accepted that the British military had 
adopted a shoot-to-kill policy.94 Believing the military was treating the streets of 
Northern Ireland as a combat zone resulted in increased animosity towards the 
government.  
 After the commencement of recognized negotiations in 1990, IRA violence 
surged again in 1991. According to my theory, a seat at the negotiating table legitimizes 
the terrorists and their cause. Given the image of fighters for a legitimate cause, the IRA 
could defend increasing attacks to achieve greater government concessions. Contrary to 
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my theory, violence subsided after 1991, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement and final disarmament in 2006. 
 
Conclusion 
 The use of British troops in Northern Ireland presented an interesting issue for 
determining whether the deployment was a WP or CJP policy. As the troops performed a 
policing function, I concluded Operation Banner to be a CJP policy with instances of WP 
practices. The initial increase in violence following the implementation of the CJP 
policies aligns with my theory. However, there is a variation in the mid-1970s that is 
worth further investigation. The British government’s efforts to normalize the conflict in 
Northern Ireland resulted in another surge in violence despite the continued use of CJP 
policies. I suspect two factors contributed to the increase. First, while the paradigm 
continued, the actual policies shifted from emergency to normal legislation. Second, the 
use of emergency legislation may have a differing impact on violence than existing 
legislation, a variation my theory does not take into account and is worth future research.  
 In this case, I have attempted to highlight the impact of using CJP policies. 
However, it is important to note that external factors were at play to affect IRA violence, 
including international events, Parliamentary elections, and internal dynamics of the 
organization. I argue that while paradigm choices are key, the policies were not the single 
causal factor for levels of IRA attacks. After decades of conflict, the United Kingdom 
succeeded in eliminating the IRA.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA 
 My second case study is Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain from 1975 
through 2010. The Spanish government predominantly employed Criminal Justice 
Paradigm (CJP) counterterrorism policies. I have selected to begin analyzing the Spanish 
case following the death of Francisco Franco and the commencement of democratic 
governance so that I may control the form of government across all four cases.  
 I have divided the chapter into four sections. First, I briefly discuss the history of 
Spain, including the implications of the Franco regime and the emergence of ETA. 
Second, I discuss the policies and practices used to counter ETA, identifying each as CJP 
or War Paradigm (WP). Third, I propose predictions on how the policies employed 
affected ETA violence. Fourth, I conclude with a section analyzing the data in context of 
the policies.  
 
Historical Overview 
 Discussion of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship is necessary to contextualize the 
establishment of ETA. Franco emerged victorious at the end of the Spanish Civil War in 
1939. He feared any action or speech that could threaten the country’s unity. To ensure 
allegiance to Spain and to suppress dissent, Franco ruled through the use of harsh policies 
that squandered freedoms enjoyed in other European nations. The Basques and Catalans 
experienced extreme repression, language restrictions, and many aspects of their cultures 
banned. These repressive policies motivated Basque support for the rise of ETA.  
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 Franco’s response to the organization was nothing less than brutal. In December 
1970, against his advisors’ recommendations, Franco held the public Burgos trials. ETA 
members accused of murder were sentenced to death and publicly hung. ETA garnered 
greater support following the trials and continued the cycle of violence. Not three years 
later, ETA successfully assassinated Carrero Blanco, a personal friend of Franco and the 
assumed future of the dictatorship. Franco was suffering from Parkinson’s disease, and 
his health deteriorated in the 1970s. Prince Juan Carlos assumed temporary power on 
November 13, 1975, becoming King seven days later upon Franco’s death. Despite the 
dictator’s wishes, the new King transitioned Spain into a democracy.95 
 
Aims and Tactics 
 Responding to the repressive Franco regime, ETA formed in 1952, formally 
adopting the name later in 1959.96 In 1961, ETA attempted to derail a train of Spanish 
Civil War veterans. Despite the failure, the act marked the shift from a relatively peaceful 
organization to one committed to violence. A Policia Nacional (National Police) agent 
and a Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) became the first fatalities of the terror organization in 
1968. 97 ETA initially targeted the regime’s military personnel and politicians. However, 
the group became increasingly indiscriminate resulting in civilian casualties.98 A united, 
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independent Basque state continued to be the uncompromising objective for ETA from 
the Franco dictatorship through the decades of democracy (see Appendix C).99 
  
Crime or War 
 Following the death of Franco, the new government relaxed many of the former 
dictator’s harsh measures. However, as ETA continued to execute attacks, the 
government responded to pressures to institute greater counterterrorism legislation. Over 
the course of a half-decade, the legislation became increasingly repressive. 
 As Spain transitioned to democracy, government institutions had to adapt to the 
new democratic regime. For the police forces, evolving required the retraining in 
acceptable practices. The Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil, who trained and served 
under the Franco regime, continued till the mid 1980s using practices acceptable under 
the dictatorship. While policy changed with a vote in Parliament, the police took over a 
decade to reform.100 Practices used by the police force and the limited use of the military 
highlight underlying WP factors to the decades of CJP policies.  
 I have divided the analysis of Spain’s counterterrorism policies into five time 
periods. The sections follow an escalation in repressive measures succeeded by a return 
to increasingly normal judicial practices.  
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Transition From Dictatorship To Democracy (1975-1977) 
 In the years following Franco’s death, the government reversed the dictator’s 
repressive practices. Misunderstanding ETA’s grievances and objectives, many in the 
government thought reversing the policies that contributed to the group’s emergence 
would facilitate its demise. Between Franco’s death in November 1975 and October 1977 
the state granted nine hundred exiled or imprisoned ETA members amnesty. 
Additionally, the government legalized the banned Basque flag and the Euskera 
language.101  
 In addition to the reversal of terrorist sentences, the government established the 
Audiencia Nacional (National Court) in January 1977. The creation of the court signified 
a marked change in the perception of terrorist crimes. Regular courts and judges 
conducted terrorists’ trials instead of the military tribunals used during the Franco 
years.102 The establishment of the National Court highlights a fundamental alteration of 
post-Franco Spain’s perception of terrorism.  
 Both of the policies demonstrate efforts in the two years after Franco’s death to 
deescalate tensions with ETA. Granting amnesty, legalizing Basque cultural symbols and 
language, and trying terrorists under the ordinary judicial system, are all elements of a 
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Demands For Counterterrorism Legislation (1978) 
 Reforms culminated with the drafting and approval of the 1978 Constitution. The 
new Constitution granted the Basque region autonomy with its “own parliament, police 
force (Ertzaintza), tax collection system, health system, and public education system in 
the Basque language.”103 By the beginning of 1978 there ceased to exist any permanent 
counterterrorism legislation in Spain.  
 However, public pressure forced Parliament to pass two counterterrorism laws by 
the middle of 1978. First, Law 21/1978 passed in July, granted additional powers to the 
police forces. Detention of suspects could be extended beyond the initial 72 hours if 
officials notified the courts prior to the extension. The law provided judges with powers 
to reject an extension, but the courts rarely invoked the provision. Courts were no longer 
permitted to grant amnesty or pardons for crimes the law defined to be terror related nor 
could suspects be granted bail. Finally, the law provided the police with increased 
surveillance powers. Suspected terrorists’ mail and phone messages could be redirected 
and monitored. Second, in December, Law 56/1978 passed adding additional provisions. 
Known as “Special Measures toward Crimes of Terrorism Committed by Armed 
Groups,” the piece of legislation set a maximum of ten days for the detainment of 
suspects incommunicado.  
 CJP policies, Law 21/1978 and Law 56/1978, authorized special powers to the 
Spanish authorities. Following the mass grants of amnesty between 1975 and 1977, few 
Basque prisoners remained in prison. Little attention was given to the treatment of those 
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that remained incarcerated.104 Lack of attention to the conditions in prisons, extended 
detention times of suspects, and the use of law enforcement officers trained under a 
regime that contained animosity towards the Basque region contributed to the use of WP 
actions despite the implementation of CJP policies.  
 1978 marked the transition in Spain’s counterterrorism approach and perception 
of ETA. In the first two years following Franco’s death, the government hoped that 
relaxing the dictator’s repressive policies would contribute to ETA’s dissolution. 
However, as the terror group escalated violence, Parliament began passing special 
legislation to counter ETA in 1978. 
 
Counterterrorism Legislation Escalation (1979-1982) 
 In January 1979, Parliament passed “On the Protection of Citizens Security,” 
which criminalized verbal support, excuse, or defense of a terrorist act or group. 
Individuals found guilty of terrorist offenses faced increased punishments and restricted 
rights. Jurisdiction of the maximum-security prisons was granted to the National Police. 
Amidst concern of potential human rights abuses from the increased powers provided to 
authorities in the 1978 and 1979 laws, Parliament passed Organic Law 11/1980. 
However, the new law, also known as “Organic Law on Citizen Security,” simply 
restated most of the provisions authorized in the previous three. Constitutional rights of 
those suspected of terrorist crimes were suspended. Mail and telephone messages could 
continue to be intercepted while the power also expanded to searches of suspects’ homes.  
Detainees could continue to be held up to ten days incommunicado. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975-1988 (Reno: 
University of Nevada Press, 1990), 37-41. 
 
	   50	  
  In May the following year, Spain passed two additional pieces of legislation. The 
first, “Law for the Defense of the Constitution,” defined terrorism to include any peaceful 
or violent expression for an independent region. It also permitted the government to close 
any news outlet or publication for expressing views sympathetic to terrorists. The second, 
“Law on the States of Alarm, Exception and Siege,” granted the Council of Ministers the 
ability to declare three different states of emergency. A “state of alarm” would permit 
authorities to control the dispensing of necessities; the movement of persons; and to 
freely enter private property. A “state of emergency” contained the previous provisions in 
addition to being able to arrest any individual regardless of cause, and to order the 
movement of individuals out of an area. A “state of siege” instituted martial law.105 The 
escalating measures legalized in the four laws highlight the increased anxiety in Spain.  
 As tensions rose, Spain deployed special counterterrorism police units to the 
Basque region in February 1980. Needing temporary reinforcements, the Army deployed 
personnel in February 1981 for “frontier surveillance” until more counterterrorism police 
units arrived in the summer.106 Again, in 1982, troops deployed to the Basque region to 
protect public buildings and installations.107 The Spanish government made conscious 
efforts to limit the role of the military in these operations. They did not want to appear to 
be using a “militarized” response to ETA.108 However, the use of troops domestically 
contributed to the creation of a war atmosphere.  
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 As Parliament passed special counterterrorism legislation and reports of abuse 
continued, the government introduced a new policy, social reinsertion. Instituted in 1982, 
the program granted amnesty or reduced sentences to members renouncing violence. 
Members of ETA-pm signed the deal in 1982 with a few ETA-m members joining in 
1984.109 The program demonstrates a continued effort to normalize rather than 
exceptionalize terrorism.  
 A complex overlap of CJP legislation with WP practices marked the period 1979 
to 1982 in Spain. Increased fear in Spain promoted the passage of increasingly repressive 
legislation and abusive police practices. The escalating trend continued, peaking in the 
next two years.   
 
Peak Of Special Powers (1983-1984) 
    Two laws passed in quick succession in 1983 and 1984 further limiting the 
rights of those suspected of terror crimes.110 First, in December, Organic Law 14/1983 
reduced suspects’ access to legal counsel.111 Second, in March, Organic Law 6/1984 
provided judges the power to approve the detention of suspected terrorists for 30 months 
without trial, to prohibit political parties organized by a terrorist, and to ban publications 
supportive of terrorists. Individuals found to be sympathetic or supporting of a terrorist 
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attack received the same penalty of the perpetrators. Attacking the armed forces became 
classified as an act or terror and Spaniards could be tried domestically for crimes 
committed abroad. Officials faced punishment for speaking out against the government, 
state; flag, or Spanish symbols. Further, local governors became responsible for ensuring 
demonstrations did not support terror groups. The 1984 law pushed the limit of 
acceptable practices. In 1987, the Spanish Supreme Court declared four provisions 
unconstitutional. However by then, the government had either repealed or let laps all of 
the law’s provisions.112 
 
De-Escalation (1985-1989)  
   Following a half-decade of increasingly repressive legislative measures, the 
latter part of the 1980s was marked by a move back towards the normal penal codes. 
Efforts within Parliament culminated with the passage of legislation in May 1988 
repealing the provisions of the 1984 Organic Law. For the first time since the post-Franco 
legislation repeals, Spain had no emergency or special counterterrorism legislation.113  
 In May 1989, officials initiated new protocols for incarcerated ETA members. 
Instead of concentrating ETA prisoners into two facilities, the government spread the 500 
inmates across Spain. By dispersing the prisoners, officials aimed to reduce the ability of 
ETA leaders to intimidate and control its incarcerated members.114 The use of the normal 
penal code and attempts to renew social reinsertion measures demonstrate the 
normalizing of terror to a crime.  	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Negotiating With Terrorists (1990-2010)  
 The last three decades of this study consists of cycles of ceasefires, peace 
negotiations, and resumptions of violence. Negotiations between ETA and the Spanish 
government had been conducted off and on since 1981, first in secret and then 
publicly.115 Talks in the spring of 1989 resulted in an eight-point agreement. However, 
just as previous and future talks, the negotiations failed and violence resumed.116 Again, 
in 1998, the two parties conducted talks, lasting for only fourteen months.117 According 
to my theory, government efforts to negotiate with ETA provided legitimacy for the 
group.  
 Simultaneous to the cycle of negotiations and violence, in June 2002, Parliament 
voted to ask the Supreme Court to ban the ETA associated political party, Batasuna. 
Nationalists fought the ban citing a violation of political rights. In September 2003, the 
Nationalists appealed to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The 
following February, the ECHR responded with a rejection of the appeal, citing that a 
government could not bring a case against its own state. In its March 2003 statement 
banning the party, the Spanish Supreme Court cited the protection of Spaniard’s safety 
and the protection of the democratic government over the right of the party’s existence.118 
The Supreme Court and ECHR rulings confirmed the legality of banning Batasuna, a CJP 
measure.  
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Expectations  
 In this section I briefly discuss how I perceive the policies and practices 
influenced the levels of ETA violence. The section is divided into four periods of time 
based on shifts in policy. In the next section I analyze the data to determine if my 
conjectures are accurate.  
 
One Paradigm For Policies, Another For Practices (1975-1977) 
 Policies implemented in the two years after Franco’s death reversed the dictator’s 
repressive practices. According to my theory, the use of the criminal justice system 
should result in decreased violence in the long-term. However, I believe the presence of 
two factors has a greater impact on the potential for a reduction of violence than the 
reversal of Franco policies. First, the police force continued to use WP practices acquired 
under the dictatorship. Second, the government was slow to repeal the bans on Basque 
culture, language, and culture.119 
 As both of these causal elements were a continuation of previous WP policies, I 
conjecture that there will be a continued increase of violence. There is no initial decrease 
of violence as the implementation of Franco police practices and the slow repeal of anti-
Basque legislation were enduring practices of WP policies not new initiatives.  
 
Special Legislation (1977-1984) 
 Following calls for counterterrorism legislation, the government began 
implementing a series of increasingly restrictive legislative measures. I hypothesize that 	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the continuance of the Franco police practices combined with the implementation of CJP 
policies in the late 1970s continued an increase of ETA violence. However, I suspect, the 
long-term effect of CJP policies decreased violence into the 1980s. Continued uses of 
Franco era police practices, abuse in prisons, troop deployments in 1981 and 1982, and 
ETA reactions to members entering the social reinsertion program, I conjecture combined 
to produce an influx of violence in the mid-1980s.120  
 
Normalization (1984-1989) 
  The latter half of the 1980s marked a return to the normal penal code and away 
from special legislation. I conjecture that the use of the criminal code combined with the 
continuing affects of the previous WP practices perpetuated ETA violence in the short-
term. As incarcerated ETA members were spread across Spain and the CJP policies 
continue to be utilized, I suspect there was a decrease in violence in the final years of the 
decade and into the early 1990s.121    
 
Self Destruction And Negotiations (1989-2010) 
 Public support for ETA began to deteriorate in the 1990s as the group 
miscalculated the public’s tolerance for civilian casualties.122 Two attacks highlight 
ETA’s failures to regain public support. First, protests erupted against ETA after the 
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group assassinated a local politician in 1998.123 Second, in 2006, innocent civilians died 
as a result of an attack at the Madrid airport. The group had hoped to garner increased 
support, but only further alienated themselves.124 I posit that ETA’s self-destruction 
caused a decrease in violence, which facilitated the establishment of negotiations. Rather 
than an increase of violence after the short-term, as my theory predicts, I suspect the loss 
of support for ETA was insurmountable to return to earlier decades of violence.  
 The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the 2004 Madrid attacks, 
and the crackdown on international terrorism I hypothesize further contributed to the 
decline in ETA violence. The banning of the political party, Batasuna, in 2002, and ETA 
attempts to regain prestige might have produced temporary minor resurgences of 
violence. However, I propose that there was an overall projection of decreasing violence 
in the final decades.  
 
Outcomes 
 In this final section I will analyze the data collected on ETA violence by the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (see Appendix D). The 
section is split into the same four time periods as previously discussed. I conclude with a 
final summarization of my findings.  
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One Paradigm For Policies, Another For Practices (1975-1977) 
 As I predicted, the GTD data reflects an overall trend of increasing violence 
during the first two years following Franco’s death. A small decline in attacks from 1975 
to 1976 can be attributed to the dictator’s death and ETA’s anticipation of the new 
government granting concessions. However, as the democratic government was slow to 
reverse the anti-Basque policies and the police continued to use WP practices, violence 
steadily increased through 1977. As the police practices derived from pre-democratic 
Spain, the violence can be attributed to the long-term implications my theory predicts 
from using WP practices. 
 
Special Legislation (1977-1984) 
 ETA-sponsored violence continued rising through 1979. The growth could be 
explained by two factors discussed in my theory. I argue that the short-term implications 
of CJP policies and the long-term affects of WP practices both result in increased 
violence. In 1979, there was a combination of recently introduced CJP policies and 
continued long-term WP police practices. .  
 Decreased ETA attacks from 1979 through 1981 align with my prediction of the 
long-term benefits of using CJP policies. My theory suggests that the introduction of CJP 
policies increases violence while the commencement of WP policies decreases violence. 
The two deployments of Spanish troops with the transition to civilian counterterrorism 
personnel in between demonstrated these two predictions in the GTD data.  
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Normalization (1984-1989) 
 The overall trend of increasing violence from 1984 through 1989 can be attributed 
to at least three factors. First, the ETA attacked former members to intimidate any 
considering future use of the social reinsertion program.125 Second, the Spanish 
government attempted to repeal special legislation in favor of the normal penal code. 
Third, according to my theory, the late 1980s peace negotiations fostered increased 
violence, as the terrorist group used attacks to push the government towards greater 
concessions. The rising violence would indicate that the ETA sought greater concessions, 
which the government was unwilling to agree to, resulting in the breakdown of talks in 
1989.  
 
Self Destruction And Negotiations (1989-2010) 
 For the last two decades of the study, ETA violence steadily decreased. Numerous 
factors could have attributed to the decline. First, ETA might have realized that attacks 
alone would not bring government concessions. Violence consistently decreased leading 
up to and during the 1998 peace talks. Following the breakdown 14 months after the 
negotiations began, there was a temporary resumption of increased violence. Second, my 
theory states that continued use of CJP policies has a long-term benefit of decreased 
terrorist violence. As the civilian law enforcement retook control and the government 
employed the normal penal code, the long-term affect was the reduction in violence.  
 Government actions alone were not the cause for the decades of decreased 
violence. Terrorism became a prominent issue for the international community following 	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the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The decrease in support and 
sympathy for the ETA cause was compounded by the 2004 Madrid train bombings 
executed by Al Qaeda affiliates. Combined, the long-term affects of CJP policies, 
international events, the Madrid attacks, and internal group dynamics explain the two 
decades of decreased ETA violence. 
 
Conclusion 
 Studying ETA violence in Spain largely supports my theory of the CJP and WP 
affects on short-term and long-term success. Not all increases and decreases in violence 
can be attributed to the policies employed nor are the paradigm choices exclusively 
responsible for ETA’s activity. I have attempted to demonstrate the causal relationship 
between policy choice and terrorist violence in this CJP dominant case. However, 
international events, the overlap of paradigms, and ETA’s internal dynamics are just three 
factors that also influenced the levels of terrorist violence.  
 As in the IRA case study, Spain moved between emergency and regular 
legislation. As there was again an accompanying shift in violence, I suspect there needs 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM 
 My third case study is Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). I 
analyze the case from 1977 through 2014. The Sri Lankan government treated the Tigers 
as an insurgency, employing War Paradigm (WP) counterterrorism policies. 
 The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, I provide historical 
background on British colonization, Sri Lanka’s independence, and the emergence of the 
LTTE. Second, I outline policies employed by the government, explaining how each is a 
Criminal Justice Paradigm (CJP) or WP policy. Third, I use my theory to predict the 
levels of LTTE-sponsored violence in the duration of the case. Finally, I analyze the data 
collected on LTTE violence in University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD).   
 
Historical Overview 
 Understanding Sri Lanka’s demographics and colonial history is imperative to 
contextualize LTTE’s rise. The country is largely split between two ethnic groups, the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils. Located in the southwest, the Sinhalese make up 70 percent of 
Sri Lanka’s population and are predominately Buddhist. In the northeast, the Hindu 
Tamils constitute 18 percent of the population.126 British colonizers favored the minority 
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Tamils, providing them with superior education and occupations.127 Not surprisingly, 
animosity grew amongst the Sinhalese majority towards the Tamils, dividing the society. 
 Following the Second World War, the almost half century push for independence 
increased in intensity. In 1948, Britain granted independence to the Dominion of Ceylon, 
later named the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in 1972. As the largest ethnic 
group, the Sinhalese dominated the new democratic government. In response to decades 
of inferior education and professions, the Sinhalese instituted policies aimed to suppress 
the Tamils. Parliament passed “Sinhala-only” legislation in the 1950s, making Sinhala 
the official language and amended the Constitution in 1972 to make Buddhism the 
official state religion.128 Several Tamil groups emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s to 
counter the repression both militarily and politically.129  
 The various Tamil groups did not prove particularly troubling for the government 
in the early 1970s. However, in 1975 government officials learned that members of the 
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) were traveling to Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) training camps in the Middle East.130 In July the same 
year, Tamil New Tigers (TNT) member Velupillai Prabhakaran, the future leader of 
LTTE, assassinated the mayor of Jaffna.131 Not a year later, on May 5, 1976, TNT 
announced the establishment of LTTE. The new group differed from other Tamil groups 
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in its use of indiscriminate violence, against Sinhalese and Tamils alike. The LTTE 
contextualized the conflict as a struggle against Sinhalese repression, much like the class 
struggle depicted in Marxism.132   
 
Aims and Tactics 
 After decades of repression by the majority Sinhalese, the Tigers sought the 
establishment of an independent Tamil state. In the late 1990s, the LTTE established a de 
facto state with its own civil, judicial and police institutions on the Jaffna peninsula (see 
Appendix E).133 Despite having superior equipment, the Sri Lankan military failed to 
adequately respond to the LTTE’s increasing use of violence.  
 Acting as an armed force, the LTTE acquired military grade equipment, including 
mortars, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades for its 8,000 to 10,000 fighters.134 
As one of the most advanced terrorist organizations, the LTTE established Sea Tigers, 
Air Tigers, an intelligence agency, guerilla fighters, a global network of Tamil Diaspora, 
and the infamous Black Tigers.135 Suicide attacks became a trademark strategy of the 
LTTE. Rather than be captured and interrogated, members wore cyanide capsules around 
their necks should an attack fail. Black Tigers preferred female operatives, as women 
could evade detection much more easily than their male counterparts. The notorious 1991 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi highlights the skill of the Black Tigers to avoid detection 	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as the female operative detonated next to the former Indian Prime Minister.136 
Government response to the Tigers treated the group as an insurgency, employing WP 
policies. In the next section, I discuss the creation, implementation, and affects of the 
policies.  
 
Crime or War 
 In response to rising Tamil violence, the Sri Lankan government implemented a 
predominantly WP counterterrorism response. The country subsequently descended into a 
civil war between the government’s military and the LTTE’s own air, land, and sea 
forces. Functioning as a de facto state, the LTTE entered negotiations as an equal to the 
state, stating demands to be met for peace.  
 The decades of conflict are characterized by cycles of violence. Refugees 
numbered in the hundreds of thousands as the Tamils gained control of territory and the 
government forces sought to reestablish authority. I have split the analysis of Sri Lanka’s 
response to the LTTE into five time periods. The sections are divided to represent the key 
turning points in the decades long conflict.  
 
Early Years (1977-1982) 
 Government actions in the first five years after LTTE’s founding failed to 
eliminate the organization. Instead, the policies aided in increasing Tamil support for the 
terror group. Responding to a range of violent demonstrations perpetrated by 50 or so 
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militants, Sri Lanka deployed its Army in August 1977.137 The use of the military to 
resolve the violence is by definition a WP policy.  
 During the early years, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed several pieces of CJP 
legislation. First, the government enacted Article 155 of the Constitution, declaring a 
state of emergency in Sri Lanka’s northern provinces, the Tamil heartland. The 
legislation provided authorization for officials to monitor, search, and detain suspected 
dissidents indefinitely. Second, in 1979, emergency legislation passed which increased 
the punishment for kidnappings to life imprisonment. In 1982, the emergency legislation 
became permanent with the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Third, in August 1981, 
Parliament passed the District Development Councils Act. The Act aimed to discourage 
Tamils from joining the LTTE by granting a degree of autonomy to Sri Lanka’s 25 
districts.138 However, the policy was not enough to stem the advances of the LTTE, 
pulling the government into a guerilla war throughout the 1980s.139 
 
Escalation (1983-1986)  
 The summer of 1983 proved to be a pivotal turning point in the conflict. In July, a 
group of LTTE terrorists ambushed a Sri Lankan Army patrol, killing thirteen soldiers. 
The subsequent funerals for the soldiers fueled the growing Sinhalese-Tamil tensions, 
igniting anti-Tamil riots. Sinhalese retaliated against the Tamils as the majority ethnic 
Sinhalese police and military did little to stop the attacks. Over 300 people died, 100,000 
lost their homes and some 200,000 to 250,000 fled across the border to India, all majority 	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Tamil. Military practices continued to target Tamils suspected of perpetrating guerilla 
and terrorist attacks. The riots and subsequent violence of 1983 was arguably the 
beginning of the Sri Lankan Civil War. 
 As the LTTE gained strength with new Tamil recruits, the Jaffna peninsula 
became increasingly insecure.140 Using military-grade equipment, the LTTE forced the 
Sinhalese-majority police to abandon and close police stations on the peninsula by the 
end of 1984. The LTTE then controlled Jaffna, terrorizing the remaining Sinhalese.141 
The departure of the Sri Lankan civilian police force from the peninsula fueled the raging 
Civil War as the Tigers established a de facto counter state.   
 The following summer in June 1985, under pressure from India, the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE agreed to talks. However, by the end of the year, the country 
was again plagued with violence, as neither party was willing to make concessions.142 
According to my theory, participating in peace negotiations contributes to the 
legitimization of terrorist organizations. From the riots in 1983 through the end of 1986, 
the Sri Lankan government employed WP policies to combat the LTTE.  
 
Indian Intervention (1987-1990) 
 Military operations continued through the end of the 1980s. In response to attacks 
in Colombo and the killing of Buddhist monks, the Sri Lankan forces launched Operation 
Liberation I in May 1987. The government hoped to regain control of the Jaffna 
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peninsula. Black Tigers executed attacks in response to the military operation, continuing 
the cycle of violence.143  
 In July 1987, India intervened, sending two-brigades of peacekeepers to the Jaffna 
peninsula.144 Three key concerns propelled India to attempt mitigations. First, the LTTE 
threatened to spread influence and violence to India, particularly to Tamil Nadu (see 
Appendix E). Second, foreign intervention was undesirable for Indian interests. Third, 
India hoped to encourage the LTTE to accept the signed June 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan 
Peace Accord, which would bring an end to the Civil War.145 The forces managed to 
isolate the LTTE to the Wanni jungles, securing the Jaffna peninsula. In July 1989, the 
Sri Lankan and LTTE forces struck a truce with the purpose of removing Indian 
peacekeepers from the country. After the Indian withdrawal from Sri Lanka in March 
1990, the uneasy peace between the Sri Lankan Army and the Tigers broke in June.146 
The use of peacekeepers in Sri Lanka and the Peace Accord both treated the LTTE as a 
warring party and as such, align with the WP.  
 
Fighting For Control (1991-2001) 
 Following the renewal of violence in 1990, the Sri Lankan forces sought to 
reestablish control in the Tiger-dominated Jaffna peninsula. The two forces clashed in 
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several battles during 1991. Dressed in military fatigues and equipped with military-grade 
weapons, the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan military camp at Elephant Pass, the land bridge 
connecting the Jaffna peninsula with mainland Sri Lanka (see Appendix E).147 The LTTE 
also succeeded in preventing the Sri Lankan Air Force from joining the fight. Army 
reinforcements, under attack, took over three weeks to advance five kilometers. The Sri 
Lankan military continued operations into 1992, destroying Sea Tiger bases in efforts to 
regain control of the peninsula.148  
 After decades of fighting, the Sri Lankan president and the leader of the LTTE 
signed a ceasefire in January 1995. However, by April, the violence resumed and in July, 
the Sri Lankan military launched Operation Leap Forward. The mission aimed to 
recapture Jaffna City. As the military failed to create lines linking the captured bases 
units were left vulnerable to LTTE attacks.149 With military operations, the government 
continued to employ WP policies.   
  
Could Peace Finally Be Possible? (2002-2014)  
 In 2002, following decades of embroiled conflict between the Sri Lankan military 
and the LTTE, the two parties agreed to an internationally monitored ceasefire and peace 
negotiations. Beginning in September, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government 
negotiated under Norway’s supervision. However, in April 2003, the LTTE broke 
negotiations citing the government’s failure to implement earlier agreements.150 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Marks, “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers,” 508. 
148 Joshi, “On the Razor’s Edge,” 35-36.  
149 Ibid., 37; Marks, “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers,” 511. 
150 Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, “Liberation Struggle or Terrorism?” 88-89. For more information on the 
2002-2003 talks see Amita Shastri, “Ending Ethnic Civil War: The Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” 
	   68	  
internationally monitored ceasefire and government negotiations elevated the LTTE’s 
status as for the second time; foreign powers were recognizing the group as a key actor.   
 Officially, the ceasefire continued to hold despite the halt in negotiations. In 2005, 
the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and the Jaffna Police Superintendant were both 
assassinated. Many believed the LTTE to be responsible despite the group’s denials. In 
response to the murders, the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militants resumed a 
“shadow war.” A cycle of violence ensued with large scale fighting resuming in 2006 
after nearly four years of relative peace. Sri Lankan defense spending increased by 23 
percent in 2006 and 200,000 Tamils fled the increasingly violent northeast. Prabhakaran 
squandered any prospects of the peace talks resuming on November 27, when he 
announced the LTTE return to war for obtaining a sovereign Tamil state. The Sri Lankan 
government officially terminated the ceasefire and resumed the war in January 2008. In 
practice, however, the ceasefire had ended years before.151 Finally, in May 2009, the 




 In this section I discuss how I expect the Sri Lankan counterterrorism policies to 
affect the LTTE’s level of violence. I have separated the section into three periods of 
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analysis: early troop deployment (1977 to 1982), the Civil War (1982 to 2001), and 
attempts at peace (2001 to 2014).   
 
Troop Deployment (1977-1983) 
 Sri Lanka’s decision to deploy the Army in August 1977 indirectly mobilized 
support for the LTTE. Although the majority of Tamils in the mid to late-1970s still 
hoped for a peaceful parliamentary solution, the government’s use of the military 
expanded the number of those willing to employ violence. The WP policy of deploying 
troops did not suppress the Tamil movement; rather it inflamed the Tamil base. By the 
mid 1980s, the LTTE had massed support and thousands of fighters.153 
  I predict that the use of the military initially prevented an increase in violence. 
However, the use of the Sri Lankan Army legitimized the LTTE, justified the group’s 
cause, and increased recruitment, generating capabilities for a surge of violence in the 
long-term. As the Civil War broke out in 1983, I hypothesize that there was a sustained 
level of increased LTTE-sponsored attacks. As the government treated the LTTE as an 
insurgency, WP policies dominated the state’s counterterrorism efforts. Continued LTTE 
violence highlights the affect of employing WP policies on terrorist organizations’ 
abilities to sustain support and execute attacks.    
 It is important to note that the Sri Lankan government attempted to implement a 
few CJP policies in conjunction with the WP. However, as the latter dominated, any 
initial violence that my theory predicts follows the introduction of CJP policies was 
stemmed by the presence of the military.  
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Civil War (1983-2001) 
 I hypothesize two brief reductions in violence between 1983 and 2001. First, in 
1989, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a truce as both sought to remove 
Indian peacekeepers from the country. Once the peacekeepers withdrew at the end of 
1990, I predict there was a resumption of LTTE violence as the cycle of attacks and 
battles between the two adversaries continued. Second, in January 1995, the two parties 
signed a ceasefire. I conjecture that LTTE violence decreased in 1994 leading up to the 
agreement. However, as both sides failed to compromise and the truce broke, violence in 
1995 and 1996 increased. Other than the brief 1989 and 1994 decreases in violence as 
explained by my WP theory, I hypothesize an overall trend of sustained high levels of 
violence during the two decades.  
 
Have We Reached Peace? (2001-2014) 
 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the 
international community’s subsequent focus on condemning global terrorism I predict 
LTTE violence temporarily decreased. Here, I suggest a factor external to Sri Lankan 
counterterrorism policy affected the terror group’s execution of attacks. The decrease in 
violence, I hypothesize facilitated the commencement of the 2003 Norwegian supervised 
negotiations.  
 A combination of two factors I conjecture increased LTTE violence in 2006. First, 
the 2003 talks deteriorated as the LTTE accused the government of delaying the 
implementation of the agreed concessions. Second, the government implicated the LTTE 
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in 2005 of assassinating the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and Jaffna Peninsula’s Police 
Superintendant. I predict, continued high levels of violence followed until the 
assassination of LTTE’s leader, Prabhakaran, in 2009. As my theory states, the 
elimination of a terrorist leader disrupts operations, resulting in decreased violence. I 
predict that LTTE violence declined rapidly in the year following Prabhakaran’s death. 
 
Outcomes 
 In this section I discuss data provided by the GTD on LTTE violence between 
1977 and 2014 (see Appendix F). I have split the section into three time periods for 
analysis. Each section explains the context for increasing and decreasing levels of 
violence and how each supports, or fails to support, my theory.  
 
Troop Deployment (1977-1982) 
 As I predicted, there was limited violence in the years following LTTE’s 
emergence and the military deployment. A combination of two factors provided for the 
initial low levels of LTTE violence. First, the short-term affect of using the WP policy of 
military deployment suppressed potential attacks by the still relatively small LTTE. 
Second, the majority of Tamils preferred a peaceful solution in the early years. However, 
as the Sinhala dominant military remained in largely ethnic Tamil areas, creating a 
warlike environment, the LTTE gained support and recruits. The increase of violence in 
the mid-1980s highlights long-term implications of a continued military presence.  
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Civil War (1982-2001) 
 Following the 1983 riots, LTTE violence rose, peaking in 1988. The increased 
violence can be attributed to the long-term consequence of a predominant Sinhalese 
military presence in ethnically Tamil areas for over five years. As I predicted, there were 
two significant brief decreases in violence in 1989 and 1994. The first decline can be 
attributed to the truce between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE as both aimed 
to persuade Indian peacekeepers to exit the conflict. The second decrease in violence 
predated the January 1995 ceasefire. As neither side was willing to make concessions, 
violence resumed, peaking in 1996. The reduction of violence prior to negotiations 
followed by an increase during talks is consistent with my theory. Decreased violence 
permits for negotiations as the parties search for non-violent means to achieve aims. 
However, once the talks begin and the government is unwilling to accommodate all of the 
terrorists’ demands, violence resumes.  
  Long-term military presence in Tamil dominated areas created a war 
environment, enhancing support for the LTTE and enabling the group to maintain high 
levels of violence. Government attempts to militarily retake the Jaffna peninsula in the 
1995 Operation Lead Forward, a WP policy, can partially explain the decrease of 
violence following 1996. While the military failed, the effort temporarily disrupted 
operations, hampering LTTE violence in the short-term. Overall, WP policies can explain 
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Have We Reached Peace? (2001-2014) 
 The September 11, 2001 attacks and increasing international attention to terrorism 
contributed to the decrease in LTTE-sponsored violence external to any counterterrorism 
policies. Affected by global events and the signing of a ceasefire, in 2002 the terrorist 
group committed the fewest attacks in two decades.  
 As negotiations broke down in 2003 and the “shadow war” commenced in 2005, 
LTTE violence again increased. Not until the government officially declared an end to 
the ceasefire did LTTE violence begin to decline. As the government troops officially did 
not participate in the “shadow war” the return of sustained military action in 2008 
contributed to the decline in LTTE violence. While the military presence was sustained, 
the reintroduction of the full force of the military could explain the temporary reduction 
in violence, just as my theory predicts the introduction of WP policies in the short-term 
leads to decreased violence. Disrupting the group’s operations with the elimination of 
Prabhakaran in 2009 explains the continued decrease in violence. Following 
Prabhakaran’s death, the government declared a military victory. As of 2014, the LTTE 
has not resumed large-scale violence.  
 
Conclusion 
 My theory on the affect of using the WP is supported with the data on LTTE-
sponsored violence. Introduction of WP policies stemmed violence in the short-term, but 
established the foundation for continued high levels of violence in the long-term. For 
over three decades, the Sri Lankan government waged a war against the LTTE, treating 
the terrorists as an insurgency. The declaration of a military victory over the terrorist 
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organization highlights the government’s perception of the LTTE as combatants and the 
decades long conflict as a war. 
  The elimination of Prabhakaran in 2009 has eliminated LTTE violence. For now 
the country is at relative peace; however, Soma Ilangovan cautions that while the fighting 
has ended, peace remains elusive as Tamils continue to be treated as inferior citizens with 
tens of thousands still detained.154 According to my theory, such conditions are providing 
for a possible reemergence of violence whether it is a second generation LTTE or another 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Soma Ilangovan, “Sri Lanka’s Vindictive Peace: A Year after the Final Battle Against the Tamil Tigers 
Ended, the War is Far from Over,” Foreign Policy, May 17, 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/17/sri-
lankas-vindictive-peace/ (accessed April 8, 2016).  
 
	   75	  
CHAPTER SIX 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA 
 The final case study is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A 
War Paradigm (WP) case, I study FARC from 1978 through 2014. In 1974, the sixteen-
year period of Colombian politics known as the National Front came to an end.155 I 
selected to begin the study in 1978 as the affects of the National Front presidential 
election cycle continued until then. The terrorist organization continues to perpetrate acts 
of terror and there have been no negotiations producing peace, thus there is no definite 
end to the conflict. For the purpose of this paper, I have selected 2014 as the end of the 
study so as to analyze recent trends with enough distance to contextualize.  
 The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I briefly discuss the history of post 
independence Colombia and the emergence of FARC. Second, I examine various periods 
in the nearly four decades case study, explaining how each aligns with the WP. Third, I 
hypothesize how the policies affected levels of FARC-sponsored violence. Finally, I 
analyze the data provided by the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) in the context of these policies.  
 
Historical Overview 
 Colombia has experienced consistent violence since Spain granted independence 
in 1819. From 1830 to 1902, nine civil wars waged between the Liberals and 
Conservatives. Known as the War of 1000 Days, the final civil war of the period lasted 
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from 1899 to 1902, killing an estimated 80,000 to 200,000 Colombians.156 A cycle of 
elections followed by civil wars came to a temporary halt following the War of 1000 
Days. The uneasy peace between Liberals and Conservatives lasted till the late 1940s 
with the commencement of la Violencia. During the nearly decade long conflict, an 
estimated 250,000 Colombians perished. 
 Finally, in 1958, the two political parties came to a truce, establishing the period 
of the National Front. The Liberals and Conservatives shared power, alternating hold of 
the presidency. During the decade and a half of the National Front, numerous guerilla and 
paramilitary groups emerged.157 Right-wing paramilitary groups have been both a 
blessing and a curse for the Colombian government. Quasi sanctioned by the state 
military, paramilitary groups were used to fight the FARC in the 1970s’ “dirty war.”158   
 During the 1960s, FARC emerged from lower class peasant defense groups, 
which date back to the 1920s.159 Formally named in 1966, FARC suffered greatly for the 
first two years. Colombian and American military actions eliminated most of the group’s 
fighters and 70 percent of its weapons. As a result, after 1968 FARC transformed itself 
into a more covert organization that covered greater territory.160 Having gained increased 
support in the decades following, FARC rebuilt its membership to an estimated 16,000 to 
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20,000 fighters. The group diversified its financial resources to include narcotics 
trafficking, construction, and farming.161  
 
Aims and Tactics 
 Founded out of peasant defense organizations, FARC initially sought a social 
revolution that would overthrow the capitalistic corrupt government. Marxist ideology 
has faded from the group, replaced with territorial ambitions. A challenge to the 
government’s rule has continued as a common theme throughout FARC’s evolution.162 
Functioning as an Army, FARC controls large swaths of land for launching military style 
attacks, a marked transformation for the group’s early stages.163 
 
Crime or War 
 The Colombian response to FARC is characterized by WP counterterrorism 
policies. As the state considered FARC to be an insurgency, the military conducted 
operations and the government held negotiations. Early counterterrorism efforts against 
FARC relied on Colombian resources. At the turn of the century, the United States 
provided increased military and intelligence support to Colombian officials.  
 I have divided the analysis of Colombia’s response to FARC into five periods. 
Each section highlights a new element to Colombia’s counterterrorism response. Just as 
the policies overlap, so, too, do the sections.  	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Repression (1978-1982) 
 Early responses to FARC revolved around the use of WP measures within 
Criminal Justice Paradigm (CJP) legislation. In the late 1970s, the president declared a 
“state of siege.” The emergency legislation granted the military increased powers of 
arrest. Reports emerged of officials abusing the power, using torture, and the 
disappearance of individuals. In addition to the increased powers provided to the armed 
forces, the government supplied a list of crimes to be tried under a military tribunal rather 
than the criminal courts.164 While the “state of siege” was a legislative measure, the 
practices employed align with the WP. The military’s increased capacity to arrest led to 
the trying of individuals in military tribunals, a non criminal justice institution. Abuses 
and the disappearance of individuals further contributed to the WP.  
 
Cycle of Negotiations, Assassinations & Conflict (1984-1998) 
  During failed peace negotiations with the government, FARC in 1984-1985 
established its own political party Unión Patrótica. The party increased in popularity 
through the early 1990s despite the targeted killings of over 3,000 members and 
supporters between 1986 and 1992. Many believed that even if the government did not 
officially oversee the assassinations, they were implicit in the murders. Simultaneous to 
the attacks on the Unión Patrótica members, the government took responsibility for the 
killing of FARC’s ideological cofounder Jacobo Arenas in 1990. 
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 Despite the assassinations of supporters and members, FARC’s power increased 
in the mid 1990s. In 1996, FARC overtook Colombian military positions, increasing the 
terror group’s image of strength. A victory for the group came in 1998 when the 
government granted FARC a Zone de Distensión, a ceasefire zone.165 The government 
sought to placate FARC with the piece of territory free of government soldiers to draw 
the group back to the negotiating table.166 However, just as in previous attempts in the 
mid 1980s and early 1990s, the 1998 the negotiations failed to lead to peace.167 
 Negotiating with terrorists, granting of territory, and targeted assassinations are all 
elements of the Colombian government’s WP policy between 1984 and 1998. The tools 
implemented treated FARC members as legitimate actors rather than criminals 
conducting illegal acts.  
 
Plan Colombia (1999-2006) 
 A joint initiative between Colombia and the United States, Plan Colombia was 
first introduced in 1999. The United States supplied Colombia with $4.7 billion, 75 
percent of which went towards military equipment and training. A key objective of the 
initiative was the improvement of the Colombian armed forces. The purpose of the 
program was to enable the military defeat of FARC. The United States Department of 
Defense significantly contributed to the Colombian government’s ability to monitor 
FARC movements with the use of land and aerial surveillance. A result of the increased 
intelligence and surveillance was the weakening of FARC’s communication capabilities 
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between disparate FARC controlled territories.168 A WP policy, Plan Colombia focused 
on the military defeat of FARC.169  
 
War on Terror (2001-2014) 
 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorism 
internationally came under increased scrutiny. The evolution of terrorism discourse 
allowed for the American government to openly support the Colombian government in 
counterterrorism measures. Prior assistance had to be primarily directed towards the War 
on Drugs. Post 9-11 discourse allowed for the United States to openly aid the Colombian 
government in supplying equipment and specially trained counterterrorism personnel.170 
In 2002, the War on Terror commenced in Colombia, beginning the longest continuous 
military fight against FARC.171 As the name suggests, the War on Terror was a WP 
policy as it emphasized the use of military action to defeat FARC.  
 
Assassinations, Laws and Negotiations (2008-2014) 
 With increased resources from the United States, the Colombian military 
continued launching attacks against FARC. In three years, the government assassinated 
three of FARC’s top leaders, one in 2008 and two in 2011. In November 2012, a new 
round of peace talks commenced in Havana Cuba. Included in the negotiations was the 
possibility of incorporating FARC into the political system. The military feared FARC 
strategized to use the ceasefire as a time for regrouping from its weakened state. Through 	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the use of paramilitary groups, the military used assassinations and kidnappings to 
undermine government negotiations.172 The targeted killing of FARC leadership and 
negotiations continued to exemplify WP policy. 
 In May 2011, the government ratified two new laws. The legislation addressed 
two underlying issues that have previously drawn supporters to FARC. First, the laws 
redistributed land to peasants and second, awarded funds to victims of both government 
and non-government violence.173 Both legislative measures provide evidence of CJP 
policies implemented in a majority WP counterterrorism effort.  
 
Expectations 
 In this section, I discuss how I expect the Colombian government’s policies to 
affect FARC-sponsored levels of violence. I separate the decades studied into two 
sections. First, I discuss Colombia’s response in the post-National Front years (1978-
1999). Second, I predict how the United States and the War on Terror have affected 
counterterrorism success in Colombia (1999-2014).   
 
Colombia’s Response (1978-1999) 
 My theory suggests there should be an initial suppression of violence following 
the implementation of WP policies. However, in the case of FARC, conflict had plagued 
the country for over a century. The government targeted the predecessors of FARC and 
the organization’s early members. When the “state of siege” was declared, giving the 
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military increased powers, the WP practices had the long-term affect of increasing 
violence.  
 Amongst growing numbers of attacks, I predict there were three brief periods of 
decreased FARC-sponsored attacks. In both the early 1980s and 1990s, the government 
and FARC attempted peace negotiations. According to my theory, violence should 
decrease in the years prior to the peace talks. As the negotiations commenced and failed, 
I hypothesize the violence resumed at increased levels. The third period of predicted 
decreased violence was in the mid to late 1990s prior to a third attempted round of 
negotiations and the 1998 granting of the Zone de Distensión to FARC. Once the 
ceasefire zone was granted, I suggest that FARC continued violence as they had 
succeeded in obtaining a piece of territory through the use of conflict.  
 
American Intervention  (1999-2014) 
 Implementation of Plan Colombia with the addition of American resources to the 
counterterrorism effort I predict provided for a brief decrease in FARC-sponsored 
violence. However, as Plan Colombia was a continuation of decades of WP policies, the 
addition of counterterrorism resources only permitted for a brief reduction of violence in 
2000 followed by a quick resumption. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States and corresponding international community’s condemnation of terror worldwide I 
suggest resulted in a decrease of the otherwise resurgence of FARC attacks. A 
combination of greater counterterrorism resources and global attention to terrorism 
should have resulted in continued low levels of FARC-sponsored violence in the years 
following 2001.  
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 After a reduction of violence in the early post 9-11 years, I predict a resurgence in 
the mid-2000s. Elimination of FARC leadership in 2008 and 2011, I hypothesize resulted 
in a leadership vacuum, which undermined the terror group’s operations in the short-
term. Attempted 2012 peace negotiations and the implementation of CJP legislation in 
May 2011, I theorize contributed to an increase of FARC violence. In the short-term, 
which is the extent of this study, I predict there is continued high levels of FARC-
sponsored violence. My theory suggests that if the Colombian government continues to 
implement CJP policies in favor of WP policies, FARC will be delegitimized, its 
recruitment capabilities challenged, and a long-term decrease in violence.  
 
Outcomes 
 In this final section, I discuss the data compiled on FARC attacks in the GTD (see 
Appendix H). The section is divided into the same decades of analysis as my 
expectations. I finish with a concluding section.   
 
Colombia’s Response (1978-1999) 
 With a few exceptions, there was an overall trend of increased levels of FARC- 
sponsored violence during the first two decades studied. As I predicted, violence 
increased, peaking in 1983. The number of attacks briefly reduced prior to the 1984-1985 
peace negotiations. Following the break in talks, the violence initially rose as to be 
expected before briefly decreasing from 1988-1989. The reduction in violence can be 
attributed to the targeted assassinations of thousands of the Unión Patrótica members. As 
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the WP practice took effect, violence initially decreased before resurging and peaking in 
1991.  
 It is plausible that the violence would have continued rising had it not been for the 
attempted peace negotiations in the early 1990s. The failure of this second round of 
negotiations resulted in the predicted increase of FARC-sponsored attacks from 1994 till 
the peak in 1997.  Again in 1998, the government attempted to bring peace to the country 
with the agreement to grant FARC the Zone de Distensión. FARC driven conflict did 
temporarily recede in 1998, however, as the group realized sustained high levels of 
violence resulted in government concessions, the number of attacks resumed at increasing 
levels in 1999. 
 
American Intervention (1999-2014) 
 Periods of reduced violence were evident in the data, but for the final 15 years of 
the study those recessions of violence were temporary. Each return to high levels of 
violence peaked at a higher number of attacks per year than the previous. The addition of 
American counterterrorism resources in Plan Colombia resulted in the 2000-2001 brief 
reduction in violence. However, as the new policy was a continuation of decades of WP 
practices, the disruption of FARC’s operations was only temporary.  
 The global response to the 9-11 attacks and the United States’ commitment of 
greater counterterrorism resources resulted in decreased FARC-sponsored violence from 
2002-2007. Concentration of counterterrorism resources enabled a short-term reduction 
in violence despite decades of continued WP policies. However, after five years, violence 
increased again as predicted by my theory. The assassination of two top leaders in 2011 
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appears to have disrupted operations temporarily as the reduction in violence indicates. 
Implementation of CJP policies in May 2011 and the commencement of negotiations in 
2012 can provide explanations for the rise in the number of attacks. As my theory 
predicts, the short-term affects of CJP policies and FARC looking to achieve concessions 
through violence explain the resurgence. 
 
Conclusion  
 Treating FARC as an insurgency, the Colombian government consistently 
instituted WP policies over the decades. In recent years, steps towards CJP legislation 
have been taken, but within the framework of an overarching WP. The data collected in 
the GTD largely corroborates my theory on the implications of WP policies on 
counterterrorism successes and failures. It is important to note that additional factors 
other than policy-affected levels of FARC-sponsored violence. These factors include 
changing presidential administrations and international events, such as 9-11. As of the 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 Since the turn of the century, there has been an increasing global focus on 
terrorism. The September 11, 2001 attacks created a sense of urgency in the international 
community to combat organizations employing terror tactics. Constant reporting on 
terrorist violence worldwide has created an impression of terror as an increasing risk to 
states’ security. Growing international fear of potential attacks has resulted in 
government leaders needing to respond with forceful language to reassure concerned 
publics. 
 Following bombings, hijackings, and shootings, leaders seek to provide 
assurances to their publics. With the advent of 24/7 media coverage, the audience 
becomes the global population, not just a leader’s constituents. As leaders condemn 
terrorist acts and pledge powerful responses, they often use war terminology. As the 
message spreads globally through television, news websites, tweets, Facebook posts, and 
news alerts on mobile phones, the magnitude of attacks is amplified more than any other 
point in history. Existing literature on counterterrorism policies has largely focused on 
specific policies implemented. I suggest that there is a need to focus not only on the 
specific policies, but also on the overarching approaches to counterterrorism. Does a 
government see terror as an act of war or a criminal act? The answer to this question 
provides explanations for which policies governments implement when attempting to 
eliminate terror organizations. Counterterrorism policies and practices have the 
propensity to not only eliminate groups, but also elevate a terrorist organization’s cause, 
fueling recruitment. Understanding how the perception of terrorism, as a criminal act or 
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an act of war, produces counterterrorism policies is essential for reducing terrorist 
violence.  
  In this thesis, I have sought to expand the existing literature through the use of 
four case studies, two from the Criminal Justice Paradigm (CJP) and two from the War 
Paradigm (WP). Using newspapers and articles, I have identified policies as one 
paradigm or the other. Data on the organizations’ use of violence collected in the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) has enabled me to compare 
levels of attacks to the implementation of various policies.  
 
Chapter Summaries and Findings  
 Following the outline of my theory in Chapter Two, I have used four case studies 
to test my hypotheses. In Chapter Three, I examined the first CJP case study, the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). I found that the deployment of British troops to Northern 
Ireland failed to initially suppress the growing IRA violence, as troops performed a 
policing rather than military function. However, my theory on the use of CJP legislation 
and practices stands as IRA conducted an increasing number of attacks in the short-term. 
When the government switched to a policy of Normalization in 1976, IRA-sponsored 
violence increased. Despite being a continuation of CJP policies, the change from 
emergency legislation to the use of the normal criminal justice system initially increased 
the level of terror attacks. The increase of IRA violence points to the need to examine the 
impact of emergency legislation. 
 In Chapter Four, I analyzed my second CJP case study, the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA). An overall trend of decreasing violence after an initial increase aligns 
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with my theory. In the case, the issue of special legislation versus normalization surfaced 
as in the IRA case study. A second key phenomenon that is evident in this case is the 
impact of factors external to the policies selected. All four of the cases were affected by 
the events and international response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United 
States. Spain additionally suffered an attack by Al Qaeda affiliates in Madrid in 2004. 
The combination of Al Qaeda attacks and ETA’s misreading of public sentiments 
highlight the influence of external factors on reduced levels of violence.  
 In Chapter Five, I analyze my first WP case study, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). The Sri Lankan government treated the LTTE as an insurgency, using the 
state’s military to target Tamil controlled territories. Initially a small militant 
organization, the LTTE grew to become a de facto state with its own land, air, and sea 
forces. The growth of the LTTE can be attributed to the Sri Lankan government’s 
response to militarily suppress the Tamils, which led to increased support and recruitment 
for the terror organization. A key takeaway from the case is the necessity of government 
control over the military. During government-LTTE negotiations, factions within the 
military employed paramilitaries to continue targeting Tamils, undermining the peace 
talks. Government policies are only as effective as those it employs to dispense them.  
 In Chapter Six, I present my final WP case study, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC). Cycles of conflict have raged through Colombia since its 
independence from Spain. Geographically close to the United States, the violence in 
Colombia has been of concern for the northern country. Focused on aiding Colombia 
with combating drug trafficking, the United States increased counterterrorism support 
post-9-11. Even with the increased military and intelligence resources from the United 
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States, FARC has continued to grow in strength and increased levels of violence. FARC 
is the only case study that has failed to achieve peace.  
 The four case studies both corroborated and contested my theory. Data collected 
on the two WP cases followed my proposed theory. As governments implemented WP 
policies, violence decreased in the short-term. However, as the terrorists’ cause was 
legitimized and support was generated, violence increased in the long-term. In the two 
CJP cases, there was greater variation in whether the data supported my theory. Overall, 
CJP policies aligned with my proposed hypothesis that violence increases in the short-
term, but decreases in the long-term. However, understanding the context in which the 
policies were implemented was key to assessing whether the intent was CJP or WP and 
whether other factors were more powerful than the counterterrorism policies being 
analyzed.   
 Two factors contributed to the variance in the IRA and ETA case studies. First, 
there was greater overlap of CJP policies and WP practices in these two cases than in the 
LTTE and FARC case studies. Second, I considered the majority of emergency 
legislation to be CJP policies. The data shows that there was a change in violence as 
governments traded emergency legislation for the normal penal code, suggesting the 
former has a different impact on levels of violence than the latter. As my theory did not 
account for variations in legislation, discrepancies emerged.  
 In my research design, I defined the short-term as within five years and the long-
term being post-five years. When examining the policies implemented, it is apparent that 
there is not only an overlap between policies within a single paradigm, but also across the 
CJP and WP. The comingling of various WP and CJP policies hinders the ability to 
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determine exactly which paradigm is resulting in increased or decreased levels of 
violence in the short-term and long-term.  
 
Moving Forward  
 I have attempted to contribute to the existing literature on counterterrorism 
paradigms, but the need for more persists. An area for greater research is on the impact of 
emergency legislation on terrorist levels of violence. In both the IRA and ETA cases, I 
saw marked changes in violence when the government returned to the normal criminal 
justice system in place of emergency legislation. Understanding how emergency 
legislation aids or hinders counterterrorism success is key to future policy creation and 
implementation.  
 A second area for future research is examining the impact of CJP and WP policies 
on transnational terrorist organizations. I have focused on four cases of domestic 
terrorism, but international terrorism has become an increasing concern to the public 
worldwide. Understanding how CJP and WP policies impact global terror networks is 
increasingly important. As states share intelligence and resources, it is key to know how 
policies will impact global terrorism. 
 In conducting research on counterterrorism paradigms, I aimed to contribute to 
decision-makers’ discussions on policy selection. Understanding how CJP and WP 
policies impact terrorist violence in the short-term and long-term is essential for 
eliminating terrorist groups’ violence. A disproportionate focus on short-term successes 
only perpetuates the issue. I hope I have highlighted the need to think long-term even at 
the expense of the short-term.  
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Final Thoughts  
 Increased media coverage and an interconnected world have heightened a 
perception of a growth in terrorist activity. The public has become increasingly 
concerned with the threat of terrorist attacks, looking to officials for security and 
assurances. As leaders respond, it is essential that there be an understanding of how 
rhetoric and policies can perpetuate the terrorist organizations targeted. Citizens seeking 
security push officials to employ powerful rhetoric and to conduct operations for 
immediate successes. However, if we keep looking for short-term successes, terrorist 
organizations will only continue perpetuating attacks in the long-term. In this thesis, I 
have attempted to provide insights into the implication of counterterrorism policy 
choices. Understanding not only the short-term outcomes, but also the long-term ones is 
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